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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODOCnON
Within the discipline of political science the specialized
atudy of totalitarian theory and practice is a relatively recent
development.! An operating example of a totalitarian movement
and a totalitarian rule appeared in Italy under Benito Mwaolini*#
Fascist government. The Nazi Party triumphed in Germany in 1933
and provided additional raw material for the study of totalitar
ianism, In Germany, the characteristics of this fona of political
contTOl emerged and were recognized as being the components of a
unique political phenomenon. These included the rule of a secret
police, the utilization of terroristic controls, and the estab
lishment of concentration camps. An understanding of the essence
of totalitarianism was further expanded with the developments in
the Soviet Union and the appearance of mass purges and slave labor
camps.
With the expansion of totalitarian rule from Europe to Asia
and Latin America, political scientists came to the full reali
zation that this form of government is certainly not confined to
one particular country or to one continent. It is in essence a
general phenomenon capable of presenting a challenge to democratic

l^lliam Ebenstein, "The Study of Totalitarianism," World
Politics, 10 (January, 1958), p. 27b.
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governmental institutions throughout the world.^ A number of
leading scholars and journalist# have concluded that this phenom
enon has spread to the island of Cuba where it has become a working
system of government under the leadership of Fidel Castro.
In any study of totalitarian theory and practice, the initial
step involves the formation of a working basic definition, Zbigniew K* Brzesinski provides us with such a definition*
Totalitarianism is a system in which technologically advanced
Instruments of political po%mr are wielded without restraint
by centralized leadership of an elite movement for the pur
pose of effecting a total social revoltuion including the
conditioning of amn, on the basis of certain arbitrary
ideological assumptions proclaimed by the Imdership, in an
atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population.3
Working from a concentrated definition, it is possible to
develop a descriptive analysis of what constitutes a totalitarian
system. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski in their
Wok Totalitarian Dictatonship and Autocracy isolate six traits
which characterize totalitarian rule. William E. Ebenstein and
Ivo K. Feierabend present additional elaborations which supiû.em^t
the analysis. Finally, Hannah Arendt provides lui understanding
of tM psychological motivations and goals of a totalitarian system.
The combined work of these authors is the creation of a theoretical
model of the totalitarian state. The purpose of this thesis is
to utilize this abstract model as a study guide for an analysis

%bld., p. 275.
^Brzezinski, ZtaLgniew, "Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics,"
Dictatorship and Tota^tariaaism, ed. Betty Brand Burch (New York:
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 196k), p. 180.
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of Castro'# Cuba from the years
The base of this model is provided by the work of Friedrich
and Brzezinski. These men have isolated what they refer to as a
"syndrome" of six traits.^ The components of this syndrome are
an official ideology, a single mass party led by one man, terror
istic police control, a monopoly over communication media and over
weapons, and a centrally directed economy.
The authors begin their study by elaborating upon the first
element within the syndrome, an official ideology. According to
Friedrich and Brzezinski, an ideology may be defined as "a reason
ably coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to
reform a society based upon a more or less elaborate criticism of
what is wrong with the existing or antecedent society,"^ Sine©
the totalitarian state is dedicated to total destruction and total
reconstruction, the totalitarian ideology must accept the concept
of violence as a legitimate component of its system of belief,^
In the totalitarian setting, ideology is an all-encompassing
doctrine which serves as the guide line and blueprint for every
facet of the individual's existence. This all-encompassing nature
is justified in the ideology's promise of the eventual citation of

kîarl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian
Dictatojrehip and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I961),
p. 9.
^Ibid., p. 7h.
^bld.

k
an ideal, Utopian society.?
The second characteristic of the totalitarian state as
described by Friedrich and Brzesinski is the eKistence of a single
mass party usually led by one man. The membership of this party
is composed of an elite hard core which in itself comprises a
R
small percent^e of the total population.

The party provides

a following for the dictator. Party membens dedicate their
energy towards the successful fulfillment of party programs and
g
through their devotion to duty set an example for the masses,'
The authors' reference to the individual who leads the single
mass party is a concept deserving special elaboration. This indiv
idual, the totalitarian dictator, possesses and exercises a nearly
absolute power which is unlimited by constitutional restraints.
The dictator is assisted by political lieutenants and a bureauc
racy, both of which are completely subject to his control. The
nature of his leadership is also characterized by a peculiar
relationship which exists between the leader and his people, a
relald-onship involving a mythical identification between the two
in which the leader and the led are considered to be one. The
totalitarian dictator controls his lieutenants, the bureaucracy,
and his people by the utilization of propaganda and terror,^®

7lbld.. p. 9,
Gibld.
^Ibid.. p. 33.
10%hid., p. 26.
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The third component of the descriptive base presented by
Friedrich and Brzezinski is the existence wiWiin the totalitarian
11
system of terroristic police control.

Terror is the prime

instrument within the system which is directed toward the achieve
ment of the totalitarian goal of total change. Challenges to
the revolutionary goal of rebuilding society cannot be tolerated.
Opposition is prevented from developing by the utilisation of
total terror designed to engulf everyone in the society. The
potential enemy as well as the open enemy must be weeded out and
destroyed. Since unanimity provides the totalitarian system with
its greatest element of strength, any deviation within the system
mist be completely eliminated.
Building toward an apex of terroristic control is a system
based upon informers, puises, and public confessions, and it is
capped with the existence of concentration camps,This struc
ture of control receives its justification from the totalitarian
ideology, an ideology considered by totalitarian leaders to possess
the absolute truth. Deviations and challenges to the ideology
are illogical and deserve rvthless elimination. Therefore, the
authors are able to formulate the following conclusion: "The
I

total scope of totalitaricr terror and its pervasive and sus
tained character, operating in an atmoaphere of ideological

lllbid.. p. 10,
l^ibid., p. 165
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compulsion) make it a unique feature of modem totalitarianism•"^•3
The fourth trait of the syndrome is the monopoly of control
exercised by the leadership elite over all effective means of comaivmication, including radio, television, motion pictures, books,
newspapers, and the educational system.^ These various media
are utilized as inatruments to transmit propaganda directed towards
the goal of maintaining the totalitarian system in its position
of complete control. According to the authors, the propaganda
is "action-related,Its goal is to motivate the masses to
perform certain actions or to encourage the non-performance of
certain other actions.
Howver, monopolistic control of radio, television, motion
pictures, and the press produce among the general public a dis
trust of transmitted information.Therefore, in oMer to trans
mit revolutionary goals and ideology effectively, the totalitarian
system must rely heavily upon its control of the educational
syst®»,^^ Under totalitarian rule, educational communication
betwem teacher and pupil becomes a transmission belt of indoc
trination designed to foster within the youth of the society zeal
for revolutionary goals and complete loyalty to the totalitarian

13lbid., p. 138.
%bid.. p. 10.
--Ibid,. p. 108.
l%bid., p. 112.
^^Ibid., p. 118.
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government. We may conclude that total monopoly of mass ooomnmications is therefore one of the most striking characteristics
of totalitarian dictatorship»^®
The fifth element which contributes to the unique nature of
totalitarian phenomenon involves a monopoly of force, Friedrich
and Brssezinski categori.z© this fifth characteristic as a weapons
monopoly whereby all effective means of armed combat are possessed
by the ruling elite.
The authors conclude their contribution to the analysis
of totalitarian systems with their presentation of the sixth
characteristic trait of totalitarian rule—the central direction
of the total economic operations of the country. This control
is performed by a bureaucracy directed by the governing elite
through centralized state planning operations, operations which
involve control of industry, labor forces, and agriculture.
If the totalitarian system is functioning in an underdeveloped
environment, rapid and immediate industrialization becomes the
OA

central objective of the regime.

State plmis are enactW by

state-appointed directors who head each individual factory.
Labor resources, including men and unions, are transformed into
instruments and branches of the state machinery.Finally,

l%bid.. p. 107.
l%bid., p. 10.
20lbid., p. 200.
Zllbld.. p. 212.
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planning is carried to the sister function of industry in the
economic system, that of agricultural production. Collective
farms, subject to the regulation and direction of centralized
state planning, are established,22 Thus, we see that the three
components of economic production (industry, labor, and agriculture)
become political instruments of the totalitarian regime and are
subjected to complete control and direction.
These are the six basic characteristics which will be
applied in this thesis to the study of Castro's Cuba, Upon this
base, further information can be laid to refine the general
picture of theoretic totalitarianism. The writings of William
Sbenstein provide such information.
For example, Ebenstein clarifies the broad definition of
totalitarianism presented by Brzezinski by stressing the concept
that the basic purpose of totalitarian rule is the control of
the individual by the state. According to Sbenstein, "There is
no area of human activity—political, economic, social, religious,
or educational—that is exempt from government control and dom
ination,^23
In addition, Ebenstein expands the understanding of the
characteristics of totalitarian regimes by pointing out that the
intricate components of totalitarian jargon are words used fre
quently to describe a democratic system of government—party,

22ibid., p. 229,

York*

2%illlam Ebenstein, Totalitarianism: New Perspectives (New
Holt, Rinehart, and VJinston, Inc., 1962), p, 6,
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democracy, public approval. Thus the totalitarian leader is
able to pervert the democratic slogan of government by, of, and
for the people by dropping the first two elements and building his
regime upon the proposition that government exists "for the people,"
He maintains the government's right to rule completely while still
preserving the appeal of democratic terminology.^^
The third contribution of Sbenstein to our basic understanding
of the nature of totalitarianism is his explanation of law as it
exists within such a system. Enveloped in a totalitarian enviromnent, concrete rules of jurisprudence governing and protecting
the individual are not able to survive. Law presupposes authoidty
existing independently from the ruling elite. The totalitarian
leader cannot admit such an existence within a system which
fosters arbitrary arrests and standards of justice based upon
such vague concepts as the "interests of the state".In a
totalitarian state, the individual may be held legally responsible
for his actions whether or not such actions disobeyed an existing
statute. His offense may be labeled as a political crime and
within the totalitarian framework such crimes are broadly defined.
Sbenstein concludes that within the totalitarian system, law is
designed to protect the government, not the citizen.
In the creation of an abstract model of the totalitarian

2^*Ibld.. p. 7.
25iw., p. 9.

26ibid.
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State, Ivo Feierabend further extends and elaborates the base

provided by Friedrich and Brzezinski and the contributions of
Ebenstein. Feierabend begins his analysis by stressing the incom
patibility of a pluralistic society with a totalitarian regime.
The totalitarian party infiltrates all other groups in the society
armed with the goal of assuring that it will be the recipient of
the complete and supreme loyalty of each individual in the society.
The pluralistic society is replaced with a mass of isolated indi
viduals whose need for social standards and a sense of belonging
is satisfied by party membership and ties with the

elite,27

The second contribution of Feierabend is his description and
analysis of the expansionist and Isolationist tendencies of total
itarian systems. These seemingly contradictory characteristics
may be explained through an understanding of the totalitarian
ideology. This is an ideology which professes to be based upon
absolute truth. The existence of competing ideologies governing
the political systems of foreign countries present to the total
itarian leader an illogical challenge. He is right and they are
wrong. He is so convinced of the scientific truth which supports
his cause that he can easily justify aggressive action towards
these other false systems of belief.

Howver, in order to protect

the purity of his own beliefs, the totalitarian must be isolated
from the foreign infiltration of false doctrine. According to

27ivo K, Feierabend, "Expansionist and Isolationists Ten
dencies of Totalitariam Political Systems," Journal of Politicsj
2ii (November, 1962), p, 736»
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Feierabend, both imperialism and Isolationism are "necessary
protective devices without
system would

which the totalitarian political

founder,"28

The final contributor to the basic model which this thesis
will use as a study guide applicable to Castro's Cuba is Hannah
Arendt, Arendt's unique contribution lies in the refinement of
our basic understanding of the purposes of totalitarian terror.
Arendt conceives of terror as the very essence of the totalitarian
system of government, a system based upon the organization of
isolated, "atomized" individuals,^^ Spy systems, pui%es, the
secret police, and the establishment of concentration camps are
the instruments used in isolating the individual. According to
Arendt, the concentration camps serve as the most outstanding
illustrative example of the techniques of totalitarian terror.
These camps were not designed as instruments for the punishment
of definable, definite crimes. They are designed to isolate
masses of human beings for the purpose of destroying the moral
element in human nature and reducing men to an animal status,
Man minus his moral character is conceived by Arendt as the ideal
totalitarian citizen,^®
By combining the works of Friedrich and Brzezinski vith the

^^Ibld.. p. 731.
^^Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (Mew York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951), p. 3l6,
30lbld,,

p . LIB.
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elaborations of Ebenstein end Felerabend and the refinements of
Arendt, the theoretical framework of what constitutes a total
itarian system is complete. This thesis will apply this framew.oric to the political system of Castro's Cuba, utilizing a
descriptive analysis, the thesis will include a presentation of
the background and history of the Cuban Revolution, an analysis
of the beliefs of Fidel Castro, and a study of political, eco
nomic, and social conditions under the Castro regime.
The descriptions presented in this thesis are applicable to
Cuba during the years 1959 to 1961+, In all probability, these
descriptions do represent a continuing trend. However, the proof
of such a proposition lies beyond the scope of the thesis which is
strictly limited to one time period.

CH&PTEa TWO
THE BACKGROUND AND STORY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
On July 26, 1953 at $sl$ in the morning approximately two
hundred young men participated in an attack on the Moncada
barracks at Santiago in eastern Cuba«^ Their unsuccessful
military operation was inspired and planned by a twenty-six year
old lawyer named Fidel Castro, These men were motivated by a
fiery interest in Cuban national politics. Most of them were
active in radical political movements and several had belonged
to the reformist Ortodoxo political party,^ The fruit of the
attack was a fifjbeen year prison sentence on the Isle of Pines
for the revolutionary leader and his followers,^
The attack on the Moncada barracks represented the first
direct stage in the military implementation of a revolutionary
movement. But this stage was preceded by the formation of a
revolutionary program, a program designed to appeal to the Cuban
people as a means of securing their open support. The platforms

%onald M, Schneider, "Five Years of Cuban Revolution,"
Current History, L6 (January, 1961i), p. 27.
%yatt Mac^affey and Clifford Bamett, Cuba Its People, Its
Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962), p, 230,
^Charles !4alamuth, "Fidel Castro—Messiah Who Needs Help,"
Communist Affairs, 1 (February/^arch, 1963), p. 20.
13
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of the program espoused by this group of young rebels were pub
licized in the trial proceedings brought against Castro for his
role in leading this revolutionary attack against the regime of
Fulgencio Batista. The base of the revolutionary program was its
avowed opposition to Batista's dictatorship, a dictatorship
characterized by tyrannical rule and governmental corruption#^
The Castro-led movement was articulated in terms of social justice
for the underprivileged members of Cuban society through govern
ment-sponsored programs financed by expanded industrialization»^
In general, it may be assumed that the program pKjclaimed
by Castro in 1953 appealed to Cubans who desired a return to
constitutional government and to Cubans who wanted social changé
based upon economic improvements. The program was expressed in
broad terms which created an implied appeal to Cubans whose
political beliefs fell in betwemi these extremes.^
ùn May 15, 1955» Fidel Castro received a pardon from the
Batista govenunent, Castro, with his brother, Raul, fled to
Mexico where he was joined by other Cuban revolutionaries.^ An
Arget^ne doctor-turned professional revolutionary named Che
Guevara enlisted in the revolutionary movement and a triumvirate

Vrank Tannenbaum, "Castro and Social Change," Political Science
Quarterly, 77 (June, 1962), p. 182.
^Adolf A. Berle, Jr., "Cuban Crisis," Foreign Affairs, 39
(October, I960), p. h3»
%acGaffey and Bamett, p. 232.
^Malamuth, p. 20.
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was formed composed of Fidel, Raul, and Che.
During a two-year period, while men were receiving military
training for an armed invasion, Fidel made contacts with Cubans
a
of the middle and upper classes, enlisting their financial support."
Finally, the revolutionaries secured a yacht, the "Oranaa" and
prepared to set sail for the Cuban mainland. The "Granaa", built
to accommodate eight people, was jammed with eighty-two men in
9

addition to weapons and supplies.

The group landed on Cuban

shores and was met by the military might of Batista's armed forces.
Twelve survivors, including Fidel, ilaul, and Che, escaped to the
Sierra Maestre Mountains from which they later launched a guerrilla
10
war against the thirty thousand man army of Fulgencio Batista.
For two years and one month, the rebels, who by ndd-1958
numbered around one thousand men, engaged in a program of guerrilla
warfare based primarily upon defensive action. Offensive action
was limited to attacks against small anqy patrols and weakly
defended police posts. The rebels spent a great deal of their
energy retreating from major military mgagements since they
fully realized the impossibility of their succeeding in such
11
battles.

However, the heroic image projected by Castro and his

mountain rebel followers was successful in providing psychological

^Ibid.. p. 21,
9lbld.
l°Ibid.
^^acGaffey and Barnett, p. 2liO.
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encouragement and inspiration to revolutionary activities throughout
Cuba.^^ ^astro presented to the Cuban people a living example of
a courageous, heroic struggle against dictatorship which strongly
appealed to the Cuban people, especially the youth.^^-^The people
began to perceive of Castro as the successor to José Marti, the
martyred hero of the Cuban revolt against Spain in 189$.
Inspired by the Sierra fiaestre movement, a large urban resis
tance program developed.

Underground cells of the 26th of July

Movement, the title adopted by the Castro-led rebels, conducted
terrorist activity, distributed anti-government progaganda, and
converted Individuals into active participants against the Batista
regime.Batista reacted by countering revolutionary terror
with his own terror. The combination of guerrilla warfare and
indiscriminate government reprisals succeeded in making life
intolerable for the average Cuban citizen, who in the name of a
return to normality, began to support, at least passively, a rebel
victory.
Combined with active underground support, composed of young
people and a citizenry which seemed more and more willing to support
the Castro movement, was a third component of rebel support. This
backing emanated from the opposition espoused by the several
existing political parties. These parties were encouraged by

l^ibld., p. 237.

U2

^^Robert Alexander, "Cuba After the lievolution," Mew Leader,
(January 1 2 , 1 9 5 9 ) , p. i t .
•^•^îacGaffey and Bamett, p. 2I4I,
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Castro's active rebellion and began openly to oppose Batista.^
Castro, the rieh lawyer of the upper class» discovered that
his movement vas receiving si;#port frcm a large national front.
Professional oz%migâtions of buslnesmen were giving him veH)@l
st^port*

The hierarchy of the Catholic Church as well as Protestant

clergymen were joining In the opposlW.on to Batista*
However, two elements of Cuban society rmalned aloof from
the revolutionaiy movwssnt said failed to contribute any direct
support* TWse were the peasants and the labor forces. Throughout
the entire period of guerrilla warfare fmm 1957-1958 not a single
peaswit revolt occurred,

This same lack of support was evident

in the response given to Castro's appeal for a general strike called
for April 9, 1958#

According to Theodore Draper, the failure of

the strike call illustrated that the revoluti.on'8 support came

\

fmm the middle and upper clemses of Cuba and not from the lower

j

classes,^®
On July 20, 1958 Castro initiated steps to formalize the
active support he was receiving frm organisations within tbm
Cubmi society. Seven revolutionary groups signed the Camcas
Pact, the final draft of lAich ims personally dictated by Castro,
Partido Bevoluclonario Cubana, Partldo del Pueblo CuWmo, Oz^anization Autentica, Fedemelon Estudis^til Universitarla, Mreotorio

^^heodore Draper, Castro*8 Revolution Myths and Realities
(New York* Frederick A, Prewger, 1962), p, lit,
^%bid.
^7j«Mes O'Connor, "On Cuban Political Ekoncmy," Political
Scieme Quarterly, 79 (June, 1961$), p, 236,
^®Draper, ifyths and Realities, p. 2,
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Revolucionario, and Directorio Obrero Hevolucionario agreed to
Support the revolution and to accept the leadership of the 26th
of July Movement,Communist representatives were not included
in the pact.^O
The pact was based upon three basic proposed prograras:

support

of an armed insurrection, the establishment of a temporary provialonal government directed to the restoration of democratic
principles, and the instituting of a permanent government dedicated
to the protection of civil rights, freedom and

progress,22

On November $, 1958, Fidel Castro and his troops marched
from the Sierra Maestre initiating the first steps in a plan
whereby his and Raul Castro's troops would combine forces to
converge upon Santiago de Cuba.

Che Guevara led an assault

against Santa Clara, the capital of Las Villas province. Santa
Clara fell on Decmber 31, 1958. The fall of this city convinced
Batista that the battle was over. Two years and one month had
elapsed since twelve men had made their way to the Sierra Maestre.
To the leader of these twelve men, Fidel Castro, Batista aban
doned Cuba as he and his advisors fled to the Dominican Republic.
Underground groups supporting Castro seized control of Havana.
This set off a chain reaction in which other major cities immed
iately surrendered, Fidel Castro and his bearded followers began

l^Malamuth, p. 22,
20MacGaffey and Bamett, p, 2kh»
22ibid,
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their victory march to Havana.^3
Dr. Kamiel Urrutia, the first provisional president of Cuba,
arrived in Havana on January 5, 1959.

He removed martial law,

dissolved the existing Congress, and announced to the Cuban people
that they would be governed by a provisional

cabinet.

The composition of the cabinet headed by Urrutia reflected
the combination of the forces which had combined to oppose the
Batista regime. However, the older Cuban leaders predominated,
rather than the more youthful rebels.2$ Jose' Miro became Prime
Minister, Roberto Agramonte, Minister of State, Dr. Lopez Frescuet,
Minister of Finance, Armando Hart, Minister of Education, Manual
Ray, Minister of Public Works, Humberto Sori Marin, Minister of
Agriculture, and Lais Orlando Rodriguez, Minister of Interior.26
Strikingly, Fidel Castro held no official position in the provi
sional government until February 13, 1959 when Cardona resigned
the premiership to be replaced by Castro.^7
One of the first acts of the Council of Ministers was the
issuance of The Fundamental Law on February 6, 1959 which consisted
of a modification of the 19iiO Cuban Constitution. Those sections

23Robert J. Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution (Hew York:
MacMlUan Co., 1962), p. 276.
^^"After Dr. Castro's Arrivals Varied Post-Revolutionary Scenes
in Havana," Illustrated London Hews, 23k (Jauiuary 17,1959), p. 85.
^%acGaffey and Bamett, p. 2^7.
^^Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 277.
27J, p. Horray, The Second Revolution in Cuba (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1962), p, 13.
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of the Constitution which discussed such basic concerns as Cuban
culture, labor, property and suffrage rights were incorporated
into The Fundamental Law without any essential changes.
clauses of the

However,

Constitution dealing with the powers of

government were rewritten and reconstructed so that the power of
the government would be vested in the Council of Mlnisters.Bo
The statements and actions of the new government as first
articulated and performed by members of the provisional government
appeared to be politically moderate. The new govermient proclaimed
that Cuba would both accept and respect its international obliga
tions. Internally, the government would pursue policies directed
toward economic development and political freedom. Under the
administration of the provisional government, civil liberties
were restored. The press was accorded complete freedom in its
access to information and in its publication rights.

Within Cuban

society, organizational groups were given autonomy in their
operations. In response to this political climate, exiles began
to return home,^^
Tension entered into the political climate when Castro -aoved
to enact his program of revolutionary justice. While still in
the Sierra Maestre, he had appealed to the Cuban people, begging
them not to take justice into their hands in the event of a rebel
victory. Castro vowed that Batista's lieutenants, accused of

^^MacGaffey and Bamett, p. 2b9.
29lbid.. p. 21*6.
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crimes involving torture and murder, would be punished,

Ath

the direct support of the mass of Cuban people, cailitary courts
were established during the first three months of Castro's rule.
Three-man military tribunals ordered five hundred executions.
The American press presented these trials as being instruments
of governmental-directed terror. However, there is very little
evidence that these trials were not correctly administered as
accused criminals faced written c bargee based upon convincing
evidence. In two instances revolutionary justice was perverted.
In one case, the accused was tried in an atmosphere described by
Robert Alexander as being "akin to that of a lynch m o b , C a s t m
ordered a retrial for the accused, but the guilty verdict was
again rendered. The second case involved the trial of a number
of air force pilots accused of bombing open cities. The tribunal
found the pilots Innocent, Castro refused to accept this verdict,
ordered a retrtal, and personally dictated the sentences to be
imposed upon the defendants,
These war tribunals were proclaimed by many American jour
nalists as being the first step initiated by Fidel Castro in the
transformation of the provisional government into a radical and
personal system of rule.

As the preceding paragraph illustrates,

this proposition is subject to modification. However, by May,
1959, Castro did begin to transform the original provisional

3%lexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 277.
%bid., p, 279.
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government.
During the first nine months of 1959, 1$00 decrees, laws and
resolutions were enacted by the Castro

government.33

The majority

of these decrees were concerned with social legislation. Between
July and November 19$9t Castro initiated changes at the top levels
of government which installed in nearly all governmental posts
member# of the radical left. The completion of the process can
best be seen by tracing the careers of the original members of
the Cuban provisional government. The first president of revolutlonary Cuba, Manuel Urrutia, chose to seek refuge in a foreign
embassy. Jose Mir^ Cardona, the first prime minister, is presently
living among Cuban emigrants in Miami. Of the twelve original
y
cabinet ministers, one, Humberto Sori Marin, has been shot, five
others have gone into exile, and the original minister of public
works, Manuel Hay, has been actively engaged in counterrevolutionaiy activity against the Castro regime.3^
Herbert Matthews presents an explanation of what happened in
Cuba. The traditional ruling class of Cuba, a conservative,
right-wing, <appf>r--!Triddle class, was replaced by a radical and
left-wing regime.

The new Cuban regime dedicated itself to pro-

graws which operated to the detrimant-afLiheuipcef levels of
society. Its programs appealed to the poor, the peasant, the Negro,

3^MaoOaffey and Bamett, p. 258.
33o«Connor, p. 2U0.
3^Morray, p. 2.
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and mulatto, but not to the professional, the bmslnessman, or the
white elite.32
J, P. Morray concludes that a second revolution had occurred
in Cuba whereby the original provisional government and the initial
revolutionary programs were first modified and then became the
recipients of basic changes. In the words of Morray:
. . .the development of the Revolution has carried Cuba
beyond national independence, beyond patriotism; the Rebel
Army now defends a Revolution that belongs to a different
epoch from Maceo and Goaesf and the brooding idealism of
José Marti no longer satisfies a Cuba he did not forsee.
Lenin and Fidel Castro have superseded José Martf".3°
The following chapters of this thesis will trace and describe
this process of radiealization by examining the development of
Castro's personal ideological beliefs and by presenting a detailed
analysis of political, economic, and social conditions within
Castro's Cuba.

^Herbert L. Matthews, Return to Cuba (Stanford, California;
Institute of Hispanic American an(i Luso-Brazilian Studies at
Stanford University, 196U), p. 3
3%orray, p. 2

CHAPTER Tsmma
FIDEL CA8TaD--THB MAN AND HIS aE&IBFS
From Galicla in Northern Spain a young immigrant came to
Cuba and began his career as a laborer. At the culmination of
sixty years of work, this man had succeeded in building an estate
valued at $$,000,000.1 In 1927 a son was bom to this man. The
boy was named Fidel.^
Fidel Castro was reared on a sugar plantation.

His father

and mother provided him with his first immediate contact of the
relationship between the rulers and the ruled. His parents con
trolled their Negro cmie choppers through a systm: of strict dis
cipline implemented by gun law,3 An understanding of such an
environment enables us to comprehend more fully the description
of young Castro related to Herbert Matthews by a neighbor of the
Castro family who described Castro as a "wild, husky, unruly
youngster,
Castro received his basic education in the Catholic schools
of Cuba, He attended the famous Jesuit secondary school, Colegio

iMalamuth, p. 16.
^Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 268,
^Malamuth, p, 16,
%bid.
2L
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de Dolores, in Santiago de Cuba.^ Hi* fellow students remember
him as a boy possessed with the desire to «in, to dominate, and
always to prove himself to be stronger than his contemporaries.
The result of this driving ene]%y and ambition were reflected in
his outstanding success in the fields of athletics and *cademlo
subjects.^
However, intertwined with this desire to excel was a fiery
temperament which sometimes colored his academic career. For
example, at the age of sixteen, Fidel lost an argument with a
teacher. After storming from the school, Fidel returned with a
pistol determined to shoot the teacher. The forewarned instructor
had already fled.?
At the completion of his secondary education, Castix) entered
the University of Havana where he prepared for a career as a
lawyer. While at the university, Fidel developed his talents as
an orator, giving long speeches to his fellow students. His
political interests were diverted from national Cuban affairs to
an active interest in student government. In 19hS, he began a
campaign for vice-president of the law school student body.

Castro

successfully courted the support of various student groups,
including the campus communists. Once elected, Castro deserted
his former communist supporters and began a militant campaign

5Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 268.
^Malamuth, p. 16.
?Ibid., p. 17.
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against them*
This interest and participation in campus affairs was
basically a superficial reflection of Castro's main interest—
Cuban national politics,

i-iis outward expression of criticism

directed toward the existing government resulted in the Havana
police considering Fidel to be a dangerous character.^ However,
this interest in politics was not for Castro an end in itself,
Castro, even as a student, considered the value of the political
system to lay in political instruments to be used for social
development. The Castro sisters quote Castro in a conversation
with his father:
I m in the university studying law and this same
study of the law makes me defend what is right—even
with naked hands. I defend the rights of the oppressed
poor against those who abuse the power they wrench from
the people with deceitful promises. That is my battle.10
In October, 1950, Fidel Castro graduated from the University
of Havana Law School with a Doctor of Laws Degree. He then joined
a Havana law firm where he devoted his legal talents towards the
defense of the poorer classes of Cuban society. He often repre- //

11
sented these people without receiving any fee for his services.
Castro coupled his legal career with an active participation
in politics.

He joined and became prominent in the radical

%bid.
%bid.
lOïbld.
^^IMd., p. 18.
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Ortodoxo Party, By 1952 he was the head of the party's organization
in Havana.12

Combining hie legal function and party beliefs,

Castro filed a brief in 1952 before the Court of Constitutional
Guarantees in Havana. The brief presented an argument that
Batista's assumption of power violated the 19L0 Cuban Consti
tution. Castro demanded that Batista be charged with unconsti
tutional activity.13
This legal attempt to crush the Batista dictatorship failed.
Several young Cuban men decided to utilize more radical methods
to undermine and eventually overthrow the Batista dictatorship,
Fidel Castro accepted the leadership of this movement. The group
crystalized their movement into direct action as they engineered
and carried out a military attack against the Moncada barracks
in Santiago in 1953»
Fidel Castro was brought to trial, charged with treason by
the Batista regime. It is possible to trace the development of
Castro's political philosophy by using his defense speech at his
trial as a starting point. This political philosophy was clarified,
modified, and expanded during a period dating from 1953, through
the two years of guerrilla warfare, and finally, into the period
fron 1959, when Castro accepted the reigns of direct political
leadership.
The 1953 trial occurred in the city of Santiago de Cuba,

l^Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p, 269.
l%alarauth, p. 19.
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The husky, bearded defendant presented his own defense in a
speech which lasted for four hoars. This speech received sparse
coverage both inside Cuba and abroad, let within the context
of the speech lay the skeleton of a plan for transforming the
Cuban nation.Ik
Castro began the speech by defending his attack on the
Honcada barracks. This defense was based on Article LO of the
I9L0 Constitution. This article guarantees the right of the
individual to rebel against tyranny. Castro claimed that his
military actions were legal since they directed towards the
uprooting of tyranny in Cuba,^^
Flrom this introductory proposition, Castro developed his
speech into a discussion of his political philosophy.

He expressed

his belief in se democratic system of government based upon repre-

I

sentative government and directed towards the protection of civil
rights.Castro declared that the first law enacted by a Cuban
revolutionary government under his direction would be a law
restoring the 19U0 Constitution.^"^ The speech also contained
allusions to a government empowered by popular election.
In "History Will Absolve He," the title under which this

^%lexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 267.
^^MacGaffey and Bamett, p. 231.
%bid., p. 232.
^^Theodore Draper, "Castro's Cuba:
Encounter, 160(March, I961), p. 10.
l^ibid.
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defense speech was later published, Castro espoused his economic
beliefs.

He unleashed a vigorous attack against what he referred

to as "vested interests" within Cuba and promised to rectify the
existing system of economic injustice through revolution and
centralized power.^^

The Castro social program was proclaimed

in the following words:
The problems concerning land, the problem of induatrlaJdzation, the problem of housing, the problem of
unemployment, the problem of education, and the problem
of the health of the people; these are the six problems
we would take immediate steps to resolve, together with
the restoration of public liberties and political democracy.^
In this section of the speech, Castro also implied that the
economy must be subject to strict government control and regu
lation, He charged that the selfish profit motivation had been
protected at the expense of the common welfare.The government
should initiate programs by which grants of land wjuld be dis
tributed to peasants.

Under government encouragment, agricultural

cooperatives would be established as a method of sharing the cost
and use of expensive equipment. Government involvement in the
economy would also include the nationalization of electric and
22
telephone companies.
The contents of the speech did not frighten middle class

l^MaoGaffey and Barnett, p. 232.
ZOlbid., p. 233.
21lbid.
Z^Draper, "Castro's Cuba: A Revolution Betrayed?», p. 11.
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Cubans,

Castro promised Indemnification to the property owners

affected by proposed revolutionary pro&rams.

Again and a^aln in

the speech, Castro referred to Jose Marti, the Cuban martyr who
died in the name of freedom and independence,

Castro quoted a

wide range of political philosophers frow AcqulnlG to Montesquieu,
Buji not once did Castro quote Marx, Engels, Lenin, or St^in^^ A
Middle class Cubans could feel relatively reassured from this
speech.
The years which Castro spent in the Sierra Kaestre waging a
guerrilla war contributed the next step in the clarifying of his
beliefs. In the Sierra Kaestre, the city-bred Castro came into
direct contact with the Cuban peasants.

He found them to be poor,

uneducated, many suffering fro a diseased bodies and living in
primitive conditions. The humanitarian nature of Castro was
genuinely touched by their plight. He became determined to
initiate programs which would improve the living conditions of
this Cuban class,
After two years of war, the fcbela achieved victory.

By

February, 1959, Fidel Castro was personally directing the Cuban
political system. At this time, the statements of goals and
ideals issued by Castro contained a philosophy which appeared
appealingly attractive to liberals throughout the world. In the
words of Castro}

2%alamuth, p. 19,
draper, "Castro's Cuba:

A Revolution Betrayed?", p. 9,
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Standing between the two political and economic
ideologies or positions being debated in the world, we
are holding our own position. We have named it humanisa,
because its methods are humanistic, because we want to
rid man of all fears, directives, or dogmatism. We are
revolutionizing society without binding or terrorizing
it. The tremendous problem faced by the world is that
it has been placed in a position where it must choose
between capitalism, which starves people, and communism,
which resolves economic problems, but suppresses the
liberties so greatly cherished by man. ^th Cubatœ and
Latin Americans cherish and foster a revolution that may
meet their material needs without sacrificing their liber
ties. Should we accomplish this by democratic means,
the Cuban Revolution will become a classic example in
the history of the world.25
In the first weeks of the revolutionary victory, Castro
consistently defined his program as "humanism." He refused to
associate himself or his program with any other definite political
tag.26 He denied that he favored socialization or nationalization
of private property. As to his own political future within the
new revolutionary government, Castro told reporters on February
28, 1959, that since elections would be held within two years, he
expected to be the Prime Minister of Cuba for only a short time.27
Purthennore, in a speech delivered by Castro on May 8, 1959
in the Plaza Civica, Havana, Castro declared that his revolution
was not associated with the communists.
Then why do we say that our Revolution is not Communist?
Why, when we prove that our ideals are different; from Com
munist doctrine, that the Revolution is not Comnànist or

^^Sam Bottone, "Cuba: Socialist or Totalitarian?", Mew
Politics. 1 (Fall, 1961), p. 25,
2%acGaffey and Barnett, p. 258.
2%orray, p. 21.
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capitalist, that it is a revolution of its own .. « that it
has Its own ideology—entirely its own--which has a Cuban
basis and is entirely Cuban, entirely Latin American, why
thm, do they start to accuse our Sevolution of being some
thing it is not? .. .28
This description may be considered as the first form of
political philosophy espoused by Castro. A transformation of
this original form appeared at the end of 1959^ a transformation
involving a shift to the left. Fidel Castro was accepting the
support offered to his government by the Cuban communist party.
For example, Castro appeared on television end denounced President
Manuel Urrutia. According to Castro, Urrutia's strong pronounce
ments against communism were not compatible with a system of
government based upon the support of several revolutionary groups,
the communists included,Urrutia fled into exile.
On Mayfl, I960, Fidel Castro delivered a speech in which he
presented his definition of the true democracy. He did not mention
elections.
That democracy has asserted itself directly in the
intimate union and identification of the government with the
people, in this direct dealing, in this determination to
do things and to strive for the good of the great majority,
in the interest of the great majority of the covmtry.^O
On May 1, 1961, Fidel proclaimed Cuba to be a "Socialist
People's Republic."^ On December 20, 1961, in a five-hour

28paul E. Sigraund, ed. The Ideologies of the Developing
Mations (New Yoxkt Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 262,
^^Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 282,
^%igmund, p. 296.
33-Alexander, p. 286.
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television monologue, Castro declared his conversion to MarxiasiL©ninism,32 Castro appeared to have crossed the line. He was
doing more than protecting the oommuni#te. He was now espousing
their philosophy and declaring this philosophy to be his own.
The depth of the atatemmt, "I am a llarxist-Leninist'', was especially
evident in an interview in the February issue of L'Unita» the
ItaliMk communist official paper. In Castro's word**
It [The Popular Socialist Party] is the only Cuban
party that has clearly proclaimed the necessity for a
radical change of structure, of social relationships. It
is also true that at first the Communists distrusted me
and us rebels. It was a justified mistrust, an absolutely
correct position, ideologically and politically. Th®
Communists are right to be distrustful because we, the
Sierra leaders of the guerrillas, were still full of
petty bourgeois prejudices and defects, despite Marxist
readings.33
Castro's conversion to Marxism-Leninism was interpreted in
several ways. To some, his "I am a Marxist-Leninist" speech
marked the official crossing over from a revolutionary socialist
position to a complete acceptance of communist philosophy. Others
conceived of the speech as only an official confirmation of the
philosophy which had motivated Castro before as well as after the
revolution. Those who accepted this second interpretation claimed
that Castro always was a Commmist. Fidel Castro personally
described the process involved in his conversion in an interview
with Herbert Matthews of the Wew Yoric Times. Matthews quotes

32Theodore Draper, "Castro's New Communists," New Leader,
(April 16, 1962), p. k.
33Bottone, p. 26.
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Castro?
With my ideas and my temperament, even in my school
and university day#, I could not be a capitalist, a democrat,
a liberal. I always had it in me to be a radical, a revo
lutionary, a reformer, and through that instinctive prepa.
ration it was very easy for me to move into Marxism-Leninism.^
In the course of the interview, Castro consistently denied
that he had officially belonged to the communist party either
during his student days or during the early revolutionary period.
He r^ated to Matthews that during his third year at the Univer
sity of Havana, he had read and been impressed by Marxist litera
ture, But this was purely an intellectual inspiration which did
not evolve into membership in the communist party or an official
acceptance of Marxist philosophy.
Castro explained to Matthews that at the time of the attack
on Moncada barracks, he was not a Maiziet revolutionary. He
desired a radical revolution within Cuba, but he felt that such
a revolutionary progz%m could be enacted under the 19W Cuban
Constitution and within a democratic system of government.3^
In summation of this interview, it is possible to conclude
that Castro had a predisposition for Marxism. But he did not
fully accept the Marxist line until well after the revolutionary
process had started. Castro conceived of his conversion as being,
in his OWÎ words;

3^Matthews, Return to Cuba, p. 11.
3%bld.
3%bld.
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.. • a gradual process, a dynamic process in which the
pressure of events forced me to accept Marxism as the
answer to what I was seeking.37
In accepting and espousing a philosophy of Marxim-Leninism,
Castro was in fact aligning himself with the official Communist
Party of Cuba, the PSP. Why did he make this choice? Castro
did this because his own 26th of July Movement lacked an official
organization. Its greatest weakness lay in its heterogeneous
nature of support. Within the ranks of the 26th of July could
be found both Cuba's rich and poor.

Between the interests of

these two groups existed a steep chasm. The revolutionary leaders
leaned toward the poorer elements of Cuban society. This alienated
the upper classes who began to believe that the 26th of July Move
ment had been tumW into an active instrument and weapon which
would be used against th®B, Therefore, instead of providing
Castro with a unified body to Implement his program, the 26th
of July presented him with a conflicting membership, unable to
agree on a revolutionary program.
On the other hand, the Cuban communists could supply Castro
with a rationale and oi^anized support of his position as the
lider raaximo. The party offered a coherent program which was in
essence similar to Castro's desired goals. Finally, the PSP
possessed a structure of organization which could be utilized in
the molding of the Cuban population into a unified corps of

^^Ibid.
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•^6 With the full acceptance of Marxism-

revolutioaary supporters.

Lenlnlsm, the Castro regime claimed possession of a "scientific"
sanction for the expansion and unlimited use of the state power
in the name of social change. The joining of the Fidel Castro
movement with the communist party of Cuba produced a regime which
possessed an Ideology, a set of definable revolutionary goals,
and a blueprint for enacting those goals.3^
After reaching this stage in the study of the development
of Castro's political philosophy, it becomes necessary to inves
tigate the relationship which existed between Castro and the Cuban
communist party.

From I960 to 1962, the PSP exercised a great

deal of independent power within Castro's political system. Its
influence was felt in the formation of new revolutionary groups
such as youth and women's groups and in the reorganization of
existing Cuban associations such as the Cuban labor unions.
However, in 1962 Castro decided that the party was going too far.
On March 26, 1962, Castro delivered a three-and-one half
hour television speech in which he denounced the leader of the
Culmn communist party, Anlbal Escalante and the control which
Escalante was attempting to exercise in Guba.^® According to
Castro, party members were usurping control in factories and in

3%acGaffey and Barnett, p. 252,
^^Alfred Sherman, "Cuba: Communist CaudilHsmo," The
Spectator, 209 (September lit, 1962), p. 359»
^%raper, "Castro's New Communists,* p. L,
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other organizations. Castro related that it had become impossible
for even a Cabinet minister to discharge an official duty without
interference from the communist party. An angry Mdel Castro
continued by reporting that several hundred rebel army officers
had come to bim personally complaining that they were no longer
commanding troops because their political beliefs were not
approved by the communist party,^
Castro blamed Escalante for the existing, unsatisfactory
conditions. Therefore, the speech could be interpreted as only
a personal attack against one man and not against the system he
represented, Castro did not refer to policy questions in the
speech. He paid homage to the past service of the communists to
the regime and enlisted their continued support. However, he
asked them to remmber that those who accused him of creating a
cult of personality around himself should be reminded that "we
[the Castro-led rebels] waged a war, we led it, we won it."^
The March 26th speech attacked one communist, but not
coramwîist philosopher.

However, the speech reflected Castro's

recognition that his revolution was slipping out of his control.
This he would not tolerate. He had established himself as the
%
lider. He and he alone would be the authorized interpretor of
Marxism-Leninisa in Cuba, Communism in Cuba would be communism

%bid,
^Ibid.. p. 5.
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directed by Fidel Castro.^^
In order to correlate this description of Castro's beliefs
with our theoretical model, it is necessary to determine if these
beliefs correspond with Friedrich and Brzezinski's description
of the totalitarian ideology which they define as "a reasonably
coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to
reform a society based upon a more or less elaborate criticism
of what is wrong with the existing or antecedent society,"^
The communist ideology gave to Castro a well rounded program
upon which he could build his own proposals for the refort of
Cuban society.

But Castro's acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist

label did not place him in a straight-jacket. The revolution
still depended upon Fidel Castro, an unpredictable, uncontrollable,
and anarchic individual. It may be concluded that he accepted a
label and an organizational blueprint from the communist ideology.
But the details of revolutionary programs would be Castro's own
creations, reflecting his own judgment.
We have traced the development of the governing beliefs of
Fidel Castro and have seen this development lead from a program
described by Castro as "humanism" to an acceptance of Marxistleninism, In the succeeding chapter, an analysis and a description
of the functioning of the Castro government, the government of the
lider maxLmo, within the political system of Cuba will be undertaken.

^3ibid., p. 7,
^Friedrich and Brzezinskl, p, 7U

CHÀPrm FOUR
CUBA'S POLITICAL STSTm UNDER CASTRO

The traditionally oriented student of political science would
approach the Cuban political system armed with a theoretical study
outline which would designate three areas of investigationî

the

executive, the judicial, and the legislative institutions of
government. The student would find that the instruments of
executive power are dominated by one man assisted by a group of
young, loyal lieutenants. Institutionalized power has been
superseded and replaced by a system of personalized government.
When attention is turned to a study of the judicial branch of
government, the student is confronted with a system of justice
which derives its existence from the ruling elite. Lacking
independence, the judicial system operates in an atmosphere of a
controlled society. Finally, in place of a representative legis
lative branch, the student faces a void, created by the non-existence of a national representative body. Within this realm, his
study must center upon mass rallies, the psychological connection
between the leader and the people, and a study of the regime's
ideological attitude concerning elections.
Prom raid-1959 to 19^ the Castro government operated through
an executive ccwaiittee or directorate of six men composed of Fidel
Castro, Raul Castro, Che Guevara, President Dorticos, Bias Roca,
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Smillo Aragonea Navarro. It was within this group that the policy
decisions of the government were formulated, A Cabinet of ffinisters
also comprised a part of the executive system. However, this
group served an administrative function and was not involved in
direct policy-making. The role of the Cabinet was further limited
by the fact that each Cabinet member was responsible to Castro
alone. Below the Cabinet of Ministers were all the organizations
that administered the specialized agencies of the government.
Included among these organizations were the army and police, the
national political party, and the agencies devoted to economic
control.
Within this oi^anizational framework, Fidel Castro remained
the Jefe Maximo, the aH-powerfiil leader. He dominated the govern
ment, the army, and the party organization, Castro was Prime
Minister of the government, CoTsirnander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
and Secretary-General of the country's single political party,^
He was assisted by a group of young men wW *rere completely loyal
to him and dedicated to the revolution.
Ridel Castro utilized the reins of executive power in a
manner and with a style which colors and enlivens any political
analysis of executive power.

He worked in a disorganized manner.

His rigorous daily schedule included impromptu visits anywhere
on the island. He personally supervised government projects.

^Matthews, Return to Cuba, p, 6.
%îacOaffey and Bamett, p, 27b.
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explained government programs to the people by talking to individual
humble citizens whom he met on his daily outings, k further
example of these impromptu appearances were his unannounced visits
to the University of Havana where he engaged in give-and-take
"bull" sessions with the students.^ Castro formalized this
contact with the people through his frequent televized speeches.^
The examination of Castro exercising executive power must
also include a special study devoted to the speech-making technique
of this leader. Castro's frequent television speeches wazrant
special attention since they represent in themselves a governing
technique. Castro possesses a unique speaking ability.

He

utilized a sense of rhythm and voice pitch to build his speeches
according to a definite pattern and in so doing created an effect
comparable to the recitation of a long poem.^ Grahmn Greene
expounded upon the contents of these speeches. Greene described
the speeches as possessing a sense of "a man thinking aloud.
Castro, according to Greene, explained government programs,
admitted government mistakes, and described the difficulties he
and his lieutenants were f£U3ing, He did this in a style which

^"Cuba Paints Its Own Shade of Bed," Business Week, (June 13,
I96L), p. 1*8.
^Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 278.
^Elizabeth Sutherland, "Cubsuis' Faith in Castro," Manchester
Guardian #ekly, 85 (December 7, 1961), p. 2.
%raham Greene, "Return to Cuba," New Republic, 11*9 (JulyDecember, 1963), p. 17.
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reflected a deep respect for the intelligence of tds listeners*

The success of Castro's leadership technique was reflected
in the genuine affection and admiration which was awarded him by
the Cuban people, especially those of the lower classes. In both
his actions and his speeches, Castro appeared to be completely
dedicated to the welfare of the people and his people were the
poor. He endeavored to give them a sense of human dignity. The
poorer classes of Cuba found in Fidel Castro a new folk hero to
replace Marti, The foundation of Castro's authority was the
people's perception of his "heroism, wisdom, and sanctity,*®
The poor of Cuba worshiped the young leader. In many of their
homes, his picture was hung next to that of Christ's.^
A theoretical understanding of Castro's system of personalized
government can be formulated by examining Frank Tannenbau®'s
explanation of why such a form of government was able to exist
in Cuba. Tannenbaum finds the answer to this question within a
study of the psychological forces which govern the individual
Cuban's political attitudes, attitudes which revolve around the
concept of the "caudlllo."
To the Cuban, the caudillo possesses all powers of government.
The leader is expected to do everything personally which is

7lbld.
^Herbert Matthews, "The Cuban Revolution," Hispanic American
Report, 13 (August, I960), p. 6.
^Echwrard Friedman and Richard Kraus, "The Two Sides of Castro's
Cuba," Dissent, 8 (1961), p. 58»
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required in the operation of a government. Such a govemment is
personal and intimate. Therefore, the poorest of citizens will
attempt to take his problems directly to the President, the great
man who possesses the remedy for every ill. The leader and his
people are one. They do not need elections, nor do they need a
legislative branch of government to represent them. The caudillo
is the personification of all govemment,^®

In Guba, Fidel Castro

was the caudillo.
To complete the study •>f executive political power in Cuba,
it is necessary to describe two members of Castro's executive
staff, men who exercised a great influence over the Cuban caudillo.
The first of these, Fidel's younger brother, Raul, was noted for
being extremely radical,

vJliile attending the University of Havana,

he belonged to the Soviet Youth, the young people's branch of the
Cuban communiât party, Aa a reward for his active participation
in the oinanimation, Raul was sent as a Cuban delegate to the
Communist World Youth Conference held in Prague in 1953. He
returned to Cuba the same year laden with Communist propaganda
which he attempted to distribute in Cuba,^^ Raul assisted his
brother at Moncada, followed him to Mexico, and fought with him
in the Sierra Maestre. He occupied a key position in the Cuban
governmental structure through his membership on the Directorate,
However, he was not personally popular with the Cuban people

^^Tannenbauffl, pp. I8U-I86,
^îacGaffey and Banaett, p. 21*0,

and would never be able to take his brother's place»
The second individual who greatly influenced Fidel Castro
was Che Guevara, Guevara, thirty-seven years old, was bom in
Ai^entina where he studied medicine at the University of Buenos
Aires. He was involved in anti-Peronist activities in Argentina,
He left Argentina to join the Castro forces in Mexico,According
to Theodore Draper, Guevara possessed the best trained Marxist
mind of those close to Fidel,He served Castro as an economic
advisor from his position on the Directorate, However, his place
within the governmental structure was given to him by Fidel, As
a foreigner, Guevara was not popular with the people; therefore,
he owed his power to his friendship with Fidel,
This was the picture which can be traced of the executive
branch of government within Castro's Cuba, It does not represent
a fulfillment of the promises made by Fidel Castro in 1953 or in
19$9. These promises Involved the establishment of an executive
authority empowered by popular elections. Therefore, the study
of executive powers in Cuba must include a description of the
regime's modification amd final nullification of these pnmlses.
There have been three steps involved in the development of
Castro's attitude towards elections. First, he promised them.
This step occurred in the early formation and publication of a

l^Ibid,
^^Theodore Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," Reporter, 22
(Hay 12, I960), p. 16.
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revolutionary program and government. Then Castro claimed that
elections were not immediately feasible. Finally, he began to
ridicule elections.^ The last two steps may be effectively
illustrated by quoting from Castro's speeches.
îforray presents a quote from a speech which Fidel Castro
made on April 9, I960. This quote aptly illustrates a sharp
turn from revolutionary promises that elections would be held
within a few months after the provisional government had restored
oMer,
It is necessary to put an end to poverty, to consolidate
the wolie of the Revolution, before holding elections.^5

In a later speech, Gastm promised that,
... elections would be held when the Agrarian Reform had
been completed, when everyone had a job, when all could
read and write, when all cMMren had free schools, and
all had access to hospitals,^"
Implicit in these quotes is the belief that the revolutionary
program would be hampered by elections. Castro was directing a
process which involved the complete rebuilding of Cuban society.
Elections would only serve as an interference for his direct
action. In a four-hour interview with a Brazilian newsman Caystro
stated;
.. elections are a myth. The parliam«ntary system in
Cuba reflected the old system, which we are now destroying.

^Draper, "Castro's Cuba - A Revolution Betrayed?", p. iS
^%orray, p. 29.
^^Ibid.

1*6
Election® now would be a step backwards, with time and
effort wasted in sterile discussions and theoretical
considérationo.^7
A complete turn in Castro's attitude towards elections was
illustrated in a speech given by Castro after the May 1* I960
Labor holiday celebration in the Plaza CÉvica in Havana, In this
speech, Castro attacked the election process. He stated that
"direct democracy, as practiced in Cuba was a thousand times
purer than these false democracies that use all the means of
18
corruption and fraud to betray the true will of the people."^
The acceptance by the Cuban people of this philosophy is
depicted in an interview conducted by Richard Hudson. "'Elections,'
moaned a woman. 'We had seventy years of elections and all the
politicians did was deceive and rob us. We do not need elections.
We have Fidel.'"19
When Castro referred to "direct democracy," to what was he
referring?

He was describing the mass meetinga which he personally

attended to explain governmental programs and to hear the roaring
stamp of approval from the assembled crowds. The ballot box was
replaced by voting "with machetes aloft,These mass meetings
were also a phenomenon deserving of special discussion since they

l7«E3.ection8 Are a Myth," Time, 75 (April U, I960), p, 35,
Hispanic American Report, 13 (July, 19^), p. 307,
^^Richard Hudson, "As the Cubans See Castro," Saturday Review,
h7 (October 10, 196U), p. 97.
2®Friedsian and Kraus, p, 58*
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possessed characteristics distinctively Cuban. For these B^etings
were not comparable to the staged, mad frenzies of the Naad or
Fascist movements, Graham Greene attended such a meeting on July
26, 1963 where, in front of the monument to Marti in Havana, Castro
delivered a three-hour speech, Greene found the assembled crowd
to be composed of cheerful people with an air of being on a
holiday enveloping them»

Some stayed for the three hours. Others

listened for awhile and then moved on. Then others took their
places. This was Castro's direct democracy.
The next area to be considered in the study of Cuba's
political system is the judicial branch of government. Within
Castro's Culm, the legal system presented a unique picture.
The first purge of the Cuban Supreme Court by the revolutionajy government was enacted by the provisional government's
first president, Manuel Urrutia, This was a purge directed toward
the elimination of Batista-appointed judges. At that time, the
Supreme Court was composed of forty justices. Thirty-six were
dismissed, to be replaced by judges appointed by President Uirutia.
This newly-appointed Supreme Court then purged the lower ranks,
22
removing approximately twenty per cent of the national bench.
The second purge of the national bench was initiated by the
Castro-directed government in late I960 following the resignation
of President Urrutia. On December 26, I960, the Castro adndnistration

BlOreene, p. 17.
^^Morray, p. 16.
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passed a decree officially dlemisslng seventeen Supreme Court
justices. The number of judge# on the Supreme Court was officially
reduced to fifteen marabers. The Castro government justified this
action by openly declaring that the old judiciary was oompomed of
too many judges whose philosophy was not completely dedicated to
the revolutionary cause* The government was not satisfied with
the decisions in eight past cases, decisions which reflected an
anti-revolutionary attitude.^3

As a reaction to this decision,

the president of the Supreme Court, Dr. Emilio Menindea fled
into exile.

Court vacancies were then filled by appointees who

received Castro's personal approval.There was no judicial
independence in Castro's Cuba.
The administration of justice within Castro's Cuba from I960
to 19^ is a subject which presents a contradictory set of inter
pretations involving the legal treatment of political prisoners,
Ref1:^668 from Cuba submitted written complaints to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American
States, Responding to these complaints, the Commission published
two reports: one concerned with the legal situation of political
prisoners in Cuba and the other dealing with general questions of
human rights in Castro's Cuba, The Commission sent forty-eight
notes to Castro containing one hundred and twelve complaints.

^^Hispanic American Report, II4 (February, 1961), p. 88I,
2%anuel lîrrutia Lleo, Fidel Castro and Co,» Inc, (New York:
Frederick A, Praeger, 196U;, p. 165.
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The Castro government replied to twelve.

Complaints presented to the Commission declared that persons
charged with political crimes were tried by spécial tribunals
composed of men belonging to the militia or to the arqy, Thersfore,
thee# tribunals acted ae an administrative arm of the government
instead of functioning as an Independent judiciary. Prisoner*
were forced to appear before these courts without being granted
sufficient time to confer with a lawyer in order to prepare a
defense,Furthermore, justice administered by these tribunals
often involved an issuance of the death penalty sentence, a sen
tence based upon evidence presented in many cases by a single
individual.^? Those accused of counterrevolutionary activity
charged they had been deprived of the rights of bail, habeas
pO
corpus, and the right to appeal the decision of the tribunals.
The Conmission was also presented with complaints that
prisoners charged with political crimes received punishments, the
forms of which serve as an affront to the concept of an individual
possessing certain basic rights, regardless of him crime. An
example of this unjust treatment which was sanctioned by the Cuban
legal system was presented in the statement of a former magistrate

^^Inter-American Commission on Human Right, Report on the
Situation of Political Prisoners and Their Relatives in Cuba
OEA/Ser 7.7) Doc h (English) (m.l.l-E 6693}, p. 1.
26ibid.. p. 16.
^^Ibid.. p. 18.
28lbid., p. 3.
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of a Cuban court who had fled to Illaai:
La Cabala is a centuries old Spanish fortress. It
abounds with dark, undei^round dungeons and uninliabitable
cells, which are now used for political prisons ....
There, in this filthy, underground hole the prlsonere
remain for days, without sun, light, or ventilation,
A former political prisoner described his imprisonaent in one
of Castro's prisons.
The only openings that room had were two holes the
size of a man's eye, through which they watched me day
and night. They did not let me sleep. There was a very
strong light that made the room an oven, I was naked.
The interrogations were endless,30
The complaints also chained that convicted political pris
oners were sent to concentration camps located in remote, rural
areas of Cuba, Here the prisoners were Inflicted with physical
p\mishment and subject to forced participation in labor gangs.^
To substantiate these charges, the complaints listed two locations
of known concentration camps;

one was supposedly located in the

Las Villas in the district of Manicaragua; the other was located
in Gayo

Largo.3^

The Commission formulated a final conclusion which its members
had deduced from the submitted written complaints:
From the contents of the documentation presented to
the Commission, it appears that the procedure known as mental
psychological torture has been employed in the political
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prisons. This consists in destroying the moral fiber of
the prisoner by means of a series of tactics including
exhausting interrogations, complete isolation, false and
alarming news, threats to the prisoner and his family,
and acts of terror,33
In evaluating the reports issued by the Oonraissiou, it
beoomea mecessazy to consider the source of the charges. T!ie
complaints came from middle and upper class Cubans who had fled

to î'îiaisi. These people left their country because of dissatis
faction with a revolutionary program directed towards the imple
mentation of programs of social improvements. These programs
benefited the poorer classes of Cuban society at the expense of

other classes. It must be remembered that emigres from Cutei are
members of the upper-#iddle classes. It is these people who
would benefit by a return of their position should the Castro
regime fall in Cuba,
An evaluation of these reports should also include a recog
nition of the guerrilla record of Castro and his rebels.

During

the war waged in the Sierra îîaestre, the rebels possessed an out
standing record for their treatment of prisoners.

There is

absolutely no evidence of maltreatment. Their conduct towards
captured soldiers earned them a great deal of sympathy in Batista's
own army ranks.^

In addition, the Castro regime was subjected to charges of

33lbid,, p. U,
3%aurioe Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, Cubat Tragedy in Our
Hemisphere (New ïorkt Grove Press Inc., 1903), p. 66.
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administrating distorted justice in the revolutionary tribunals
which tried Batista supporters*

Yet subsequent writings by

Zeitlin, Scheer, Draper, and Matthews revealed that these trials
were with few exceptions conducted in a fit manner. The arrested
person was charged with a specific crime in writing.

He had an

immediate right to contact a lawyer. The defendant was tried
before a three man board, one member of which was a lawyer. Each
defendant possessed the right to appeal his verdict within twentyfour hours to a Supreme Court of Military Justice composed of five
members,35
The court appearance of the prisoners captured in the April,
1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion also presents a modification to the
treatment descidbed in the CoOTission's reports. A total of
1,179 prisoners were tried in the Castillo del Principe prison
in Havana before a five-man military court. The defendants'
condition as they appeared in court reflected the reception of
good treatment. They appeared to be clean, healthy, and well fed
after two months of detention in Cuba, The proceedings which
followed in the court room were orderly. According to Cuban law,
the invaders could be subject to the death penalty. let not one
was sentenced to death.^
From the proceeding description, it is possible to conclude
one concrete fact. The Cuban judicial system and legal codes from

3^Ibid., p. 6$.
3%i8panic American Report, 1$ (Jvme, 1962), p. 316.
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1959 to 1964 were subject to the will of the ruling regime. An
independent judiciary did not exist in Cuba,

However, as to the

administration of justice, including the punishment delivered to
conviceted prisoners, the conflicting reports and prejudiced
sources limit the ability to present a clear, accurate picture.
The next area to be considered in the study of the political
system is the role of political parties within the governmental
framework. In the case of Cuba, this study is intricately con
nected with the role played by the Popular Socialist Party, the
communist party of Cuba.
From all indications, Castro in 1959 was not an active member
of the Cuban communist party. In fact, at the beginning of the
revolutionary movement, the Cuban communists made public their
opposition to both Castro and his movement. In turn, Castro did
not include the communist party among signers of the Pact of
Caracas. With the growing number of Castro supporters, the com
munist line of opposition to Castro shifted. A communist repre
sentative was sent to the Sierra Maestre in 1958 to form an
alliance with Castro. The communist party then ordered its members
to give full support to the revolution by joining the guerrilla
forces and by participating in urban terrorist activity.
At the completion of the victorious revolt, Castro, accepting
the reins of government, began to initiate a revolutionaiy program

37ltonald M. Schneider, "Five Years of Cuban Revolution,"
Current IHLstory, ii6 (January, 196L), p. 28.

which in its content of social change alienated most of his middle
and upper class supporters»

His style of governing which evolved

into personalized rule alienated members of the 26th of July Move
ment who had fought against one-man rule. Therefore, the 26th of
July wasnot organized by Fidel into a working political party.^
Castro did not trust the other parties which had signed the Pact
of Caracas since he felt that they represented too conservative a
view»

There was no native revolutionary party present to offer

a program which could effectively challenge the communist party»
The ccmnunist party reacted to the initiated revolutionary program
by giving it its full support.
The Popular Socialist Party, headed by Bias xioca, Juan Marlnello,
and Anlbal Escalante, all old-time Stalinist-following communists,
were able to offer Castro an organization and an ideology.By
July, i960, the PSP was the only functioning political party in
Cuba. The power of the PSP was seen in its government-sanctioned
control over newly created revolutionary associations of young
people, women, and civic groups.^

But this was a power which
y
was still subject to the control of the lider who effectively
challenged Escalante in 1962, Fidel used the communists. They

3®Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution» p. 383.
^%chneider, p. 28.
^%heodore Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," Reporter, 22
(May 12, I960), p. 18.
^MacGaffey and Barnett, p. 260.

did not succeed in controlling him.
Since the Cuban communist party maintained very close con
nections with the Soviet Union, it becomes necessary to determine
if Castro's economic and military dependence upon the USSR served
to strengthen the Cuban communist party and to inhibit Castro's
political power, Castro did not conceive of his economic depen
dence upon the Soviet bloc as being coœpai^ble to Cuba's previous
economic domination by the United States. For example, the
Russians brought Cuban sugar, but they did not own Cuban planta
tions or sugar mills.^
Furthermore, the Cuban missile crisis exemplified the nature
of the relationship which existed between Moscow and Havana, In
an interview with Herbert Matthew, Fidel Castro declared several
times that it was his idea to place missiles in Cuba, not the
Russians,After the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro believed that
he needed missiles as a deterrent to any future attack on a lai^er
scale than the invasion had been. Fidel claimed that he convinced
the Russians of this need.
In order to repair the damage caused by their highhanded
treatment of Fidel during the crisis, the Russians invited Castro
to the Soviet Union, The Soviet leaders accorded him a reception
as no other foreign visitor had ever received in Russia,^ The

^^Matthew, Return to Cuba, p. 12,
^%bid,, p, 15.
^Ibid., p. 12,
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Russians seemed to realize fully that they were dealing with a
national leader who possessed an independent mind. According to
Herbert Matthews, "When the Russians want to influence Fidel they
cannot huff and puff like the wind; they must bathe him in sunshine,"^^
In 1961, Castro announced the formation of a new political
party, the Integrated Revolutionary Oi^aniaations (ORI). This
party constituted an alliance between the communist party, the
remaining elaaents of the 26th of July Movement, and the Directerio Revolucionario, a student group which actively opposed
Batista.031 was established to fulfill the need of a wellorganized political instrument to support the programs of the
Castro regime»

Each of the major Cuban govemment agencies and

ainistides had its counterpart in ORI. The leading officials
in ORI were Carlos Rodriguez, Anibal Escalante, and Fabio Grobart,
all old-time communists.^^ It soon became obvious to Castro that
PSP influence in ORI was too extensive. The Castro revolution
was being confiscated by the PSP, Castro effectively challenged
the PS? and secured the downfall of Escalante, Then Castro
annoimced that 081 would be replaced by a new party organization.
The new party was named the Partido Unificado de 1# Revolucion
Socialists de Cuba (PURSC), In I96U, branches of the party were

^5lbld., p. 12,
^%raper, «Castro's fîew Communists," p. 3,
^7lhid.. p. 18.
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in existence on the local, municipal, and provincial levels of
Cuba, On the national level, the party was directed by the M.recci6n Macional, composed of twenty-five persons. It was Castro's
announced goal that the PUHSC would embrace all organisations which
espoused loyalty to the revolution, including youth groups, the
military, and trade unions. The PS? was incorporated into the
new party. But within the structure of the FURSG, it was only
one element and certainly not the controlling element,^
By Januajy, 196U, the new party had accepted 2$,000 Cubans
into its membership, a membership which was eventually expected
to grow to 35»000. Individuals who desired party membership had
to meet three qualifications: the candidate must be a first-rate
worker, he must belong to a defense organization, and he must
have participated in some of the government sponsored courses in
self-improvement«

li9

PURSC did not govern since it was not granted administrative
powers. It was the desire of the Castro Mgime to have the party
serve as an intermediary between the government and the people at
every level. Party members were expected to direct their energies
towards the fulfillment of government projects. It was members
of PURSC who served as effective volunteers in Cuba's time of
emergency as hurricane Flora hit Cuba's shores.

But it w&s to

be clearly understood that PURSC was an instrument of the government.

^%atthews. Return to Cuba, p. ?.
^^Hispanic American Report, 16 (January, I96h), p. 1055.

S8
It did not control the government. In fact, there was no requirePient that government officials and even members of the Cabinet
belong.This was the stnictiire and purpose 3f Castrons singleparty organization.
The executive, judicial, and party system composed thé
Cuban political system as it operated within Cuba between 19$9
to 196k. However, the Ideological motivations of the Castro regime
have led to an involvement in international politics.

The Castro

regime accepted and expounded a philosophy of expansionism based
upon a belief in the purity and coirectness of its own political
system.

Castro strongly desired the rebuilding of every country

in Latin America according to the blueprint of the revolutionary
Cuban government.

On July 26, 1960 at a public speech, Castro

said, "If they want to accuse us of wanting a revolution in all
America , .. let them accuse us."^^

The Castro government sponaared

programs which brought hundred of Latin American students and
leaders to Cuba where they received indoctrination and training

aimed at developing them Into guerrilla fighters who can effectfo
tively overthrow their home governments.^
Cuban embassies in
Latin America openly engaged in subversive activity against
existing governments. They distributed printed laaterial throughout

5%atthews, Return to Cuba, p. 7.
S., Department of State, Cuba (Inter-American Series,
1961), p. 2$.
^^Ibld.. p. 22.

Latin American countries, including Guevara's manual on guerrilla
warfare. During 1959, the Castro government supported unsuccesafal
armed invasions to Panaussa, Nicaragua, the Dominican Hepablic, smd
Haiti.In 1963, an attempted plot led by Cubans to overthrow
the government of Venezuela was uncovered and successfully pre
vented by that coimtry's government.^ As a result of these
actions, seven American states broke diplomatic relations with
Cuba.^^
This completes the study of the model of the Cuban political
system under the Castro regime.

We may conclude that Cuba from

1959 to 1961* was governed by a personalized system of government
which utilized a controlled judicial system and a single party to
initiate and accomplish its programs, programs which were carried
beyond the boundaries of Cuba to other countries of Latin America.
How do these conditions correspond to our theoretical model?
Within the poUW-cal system of Castro's Cuba were found two
elements which correspond to the descriptions presented by Friedrich and Briezinski, The leadership exercised by Fidel Castro was
characterized by the existence of one dominating political figure
who exercised absolute power#

Furthermore, the PUESC, Cuba's

single mass party, is illustrative of Friedrich's and Brzezinski's

S3lhld..

p. 27.

Cuba's Brazen Blueprint for Subversion," Reader's Digest,
(August, 1965), p. 67.
S., Department of State, Cuba, p. 29.
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theoretical iswdel of the totalitarian state.
The transformation by the Castro regime of Cuba's judicial
system into a direct instrument of political power is illustra
tive of Ebenstein's description of law within a totalitarian
syst®®. Judges in Cuba were held responsible to the Premier who
expected them to perform their functions in accordance with his
revolutionary programs. In addition, the list of charges pressnted
to the Inter-American Commission concerning the treatment of
political prisoners within Cuba's legal system represents an
example of operational terror as described by Hannah Arendt.
Finally, the Castro regime's interference with the opera
tions of independent government of Latin America corresponds to
the expansionist tendencies described by Ivo Feierabend.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE CUBAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM UmgR THE CASTRO REGIME

In analyzing the Cuban economic eystem this thesis will
describe fovx components—industry, agriculture, the flow of
capital within the system, and labor. An individual!zed analysis
of each of these components #ill contribute to a broad under
standing of the process of the production and distribution of
goods within a society. Purthemore, since politics is the study
of wlK> gets what, where, and when, this analysis will involve the
question of the relationship between the political and econmie
systems within the society being analyzed. The essential question
which must be answered in the study of any economic system is
that of control of planning. Where on the economic continuum
between complete individualistic capitalisa and complete govern
ment direction does Cuba lie? From this perspective, we will
begin a study of the Cuban economic system under the Castro
regime, concentrating first upon industrial production.
In 1959 the victorious rebels faced an economic challenge,
the challenge of an economic systan generally acknowle%ed to

be structurally unsound, Cuba possessed an economy which «rats
dominated by the production of one crop, sugar. This was a
cnop which was sold on a fluctuating market, which provided only
seasonal employment for the Cuban agricultural worker, and which
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was sold primarily to one country, the United States,
This description represents the export side of the Cuban
economic coin, Th# import side of the coin also presented a
challenge. Cuban imports far exceeded exports. Cuba, whose
greatest source of wealth is her rich soil, depended on imports
for foodstuffs.

As with her exports, the imports involved a

depmdence upon one country, the United States.^
Castro and his economic advisors believed that a partial
remedy for these economic ills lay in a program emphasizing indus
trialization. Since sixty per cent of Cuba's industrial production
was controlled by American business interests, Castro believed
his first task to be the liberation of this sector of economic
production.^ From June I960 to February 1961, the Castro goverafflent expropriated all foreign companies. A program of nationali
zation vas then extended to include aU public services such as
public uidlities and even banking institutions. Govenment take
over finally culminated in the naM.onalization of principal Cuban
companies whose sdzs and resources made them of value to the
govenment.^

^Dudley Seers, "Introduction," in Cuba, The Econoadc and
SocicOL Revolution, ed, by Dudly Seers (North Carolina; "^he
University of Worth Carolina Press, 196&), p. 19.
2john Serassi, "What Is Castroism*8 Appeal," New Republic,
II48 (January-June, 1963), p. 13.
3Max Nolff, "Industrial Organization," in Cuba, The Ecoa<«d.c
and Social Revolution, ed. by Dudly Seers (North Carolina: the
University of North Carolina Press, 196it), p. 29$.
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Castro's Cuba was confronted with the unsolved problem of
initiating accelerated industrial development. The regime believed
that this problem could be solved by utilizing the approach of
a centrally planned econongr.^ To Implement this planning a
Ministry of Industry was created to administer industrial produc
tion, Furthermore, from among the array of Castro's advisors,
one of his key men was ohoeen to head the ministry, Che Guevara.^
The Ministry of Industry was composed of five vice-ministers,
each of whom was responsible for one aspect of industrial produc
tion. These divisions were: basic industry, light industry,
economy, industrial construction, and technical development.^ An
o]%anlnational plmi was foimdated which provided for the operation
of the ministry through six provincial offices,^
The complexity involved in organizing a controlled system of
industrial preductlon was illustrated by the further breakdown
of oi^aniaatlon below the pjrovinoial offices. All of the state
companies which were involved with the production of similar pro
ducts were grouped together into empresaa consolidas (consolidated
enterpriLses).®

These groupings facilitated the administration of

these companies.

%bld., p. 285.
^Ibid., p. 298.
%bld., p. 299.
7lbld.. p. 300.
Gibld.. p. 301.
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Revolutionary goals and ideals became intricate components
in the operations of the Cuban nationalized industries. Salaries
within Individual companies were equalized. The factory admin
istrator made only as much as the skilled laborer, Cosmunal
incentives were stressed by condemning private self-interest motlvationa.9 Profits were

nationalized»10

The state-owned companies

deposited their profits from the sale of products into the General
State Fund, the title of the government's account in the Cuban
n
national bank.
The Ministry of Industry, the eapresas consolidas, and the
controlled operations of individual factories by state appointed
managers comprised the instruments of government regulation of
industrial production. These instruments were topped by a Central
Planning Board (JUCEPLAK) which coordinated, organized, and for
mulated general economic goals and programs.
JUCEPLAN was given the responsibility of preparing long
range economic plans, modeled on those developed by the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.This central planning
council was composed of the prime minister, the ministers of
defense, finance, public works, economy, the president of the
national bank, the chief administrator of the agrarian reform

^Seers, p. 6,
l%acOaffey and Bamett, p, 271,
llNolff, p. 30ii.
^^Seera, p. U6,
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program, and Guevara, ôîinister of Industry.This planning
agency operated on a national level.
However, economic planning must reach the regional and local
levels, too, A coordinating agency. Junta de Coordinacion (JUCEI)
was established and given the responsibility of establishing
units on the provincial level to serve as an intermediary between
the national planning board and regional units of produoticm,^
The national and regional planning agencies were assigned
the overwhelming task of formulating and implementing a complete
economic program involving several complex components, A pro
duction plan had to be formulated, stipulating what products the
consolidated enterprises would produce. Problems of supply had
to be solved at the planning stage. The cost of products as well
as the wages of workers had to be determined. Finally, planning
involved the determination of production expenses including investment costs, ^
This elaborate system of organizational control operated and
administrated Cuban industrial production. Ninety-five per cent
of Cuban industrial output came from government-owned factorles.^^
The Castro government became involved with the production of
electricity, textiles, shoes, hardware, basic metals, chemical

13MacGaffey and Bamett, p. 276,
^^liispanlc American Report, lit (August, 1961), p. 500,
l^Nolff, p. 305.
p. 296.
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products, and the refining of petroleum and

sugar.

^7

Castro and his economic planners faced their moment of truth
in 1?63. Centralized Industrial production was not reaping profits.
Concrete results sharply contradicted the formulated theoretical
econo-oic plans, Economic failures were clearly illustrated as
Cuba faced its financial trade deficit. The communist world was
?

exporting $1,600,000,CKX) worth of goods to Cuba, yet Cuban ship
ments to the bloc equaled about $it00,000,cx)0. Therefore, Soviet
money was being used to finance a trade gap,^®

The Cuban plans

for expanded industrialization had not successfully matured.
What had happened to turn expected profits into actual losses?
The answer to this question is composed of various elements.
Within a period of only two years, Cuba's industrial system had
been completely transformed from a capitalistic type of production
to a system of highly centralized government planning. The revo
lutionary government faced the challenge of first preventing the
paralyzation of existing industrial production and then maintaining
and eventually raising production levels. The regime prepared
an organizational plan on paper.
plan often failed.

But the implementation of this

ComMunieatlons between ministries and produc

tion units was often bogged down.^^ The formation of

^^rUspanlc American Reportj l5 (February, 1963), p, 1101*.
^®Edwin M, Martin, "Cuba, Latin America, and Gommunlm,"
The Department of State Itolletin, it? (October lii, 1963), p. $75.
l%eers, p. 50.
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production plans *as ccaplicated by the lack of reliable statistics
upon which to base such plans.20 These problems were capped by
the fact that a large part of Cuba's adad.nistrative and technical
personnel, members of the middle and upper classes who disagreed
with revolutionary programs, tmd fled into exile.The vacancies
left by their emigration were often filled with administrators
whose qualifications were political and not technical.
Added to administrative difficulties were mechanical diffi
culties. The regime attempted to replace the worn parts of
American-made machinery with Soviet-produced parts, an attempt
which succeeded in wrecking the American equipment. The only
alternative left to Cuba's economic planners v&a to replace Amer
ican machinery with Soviet machinery. Thus extensive Mounts of
capital uhjoh was needed to expand industry had to be used to
prevent ctmplete paralyzatlon of production.
Burdened with these problms, Castro visited the Soviet
Union at the end of April, 1963. Castro was very impressed with
Soviet economic plans. Upon returning to Cuba, be delivered a
speech on June 1* in which he compared the Soviet and Cuban
economic systems. "In Russia," he said, "everyone is dedicated

%bld., p. 1*9.
^Draper, Myths and Realities, p. 130.
22seers, p.
^^Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Castro's Choice," Spectator, 210
(March 22, 1963), p. 3U5.
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to the economy id.th such seriousness that a Cuban visitor feels
a little ashamed of his own people's attitude.He added:
The Cubans are somewhat idealistic revolutionaries
who agitate a great deal and mobilize a great deal but
build all that in the air without realizing that every
thing must have an absolutely fundamental basis in the
economy.25
When Castro referred to "idealistic revolutionaries" whose
idealism was not always economically sound, we may assume that
the regime was at least Indirectly admitting that its industrial
stress wasoverdone. In Moscow, Castro agreed that Cuba would
develop its economy through specialization, emphasizing agricul
tural production,The aim of the economic program became to
reduce, but not to eliminate, the effort to industrialize and to
27
concentrate upon agricultural piwiuction, especially sugar.
This change of emphasis within Cuban economic planning leads to
the next area of economic study, the second component of an
economic system, agricultural production.
The stuc^ of Cuban agriculture within the Castro regime
involves the concentration upon one government ministry, the
Institute Nacional de la Reform Agraria (IMA). Using this
agency as the focal point of investigation, the analysis of Cuban

2%heodore Draper, "Castro, Khrushchev, and Mao," Reporter,
29 (August 15, 1963), p. 29,
^^Ibld.
%bid.
^^Matthews. Return to Cuba, p. 6.
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agricultural production may be expanded to include a study of
land distribution, collective farming, and state-operated faras.
In 1959 the regime attempted to formulate an agricultural
program. The government faced a system of agricultural produc
tion dominated by the production of a single crop, augar#

From

1929 to 19$9t Cuban agriculture failed to adjust itself to a
sugar market which periodically declined and very slowly recovered.
Some diversification was attempted to balance these shifting
scales in market conditions, but this diversification had not
been extensive enough. Therefore, agriculture profits continued

28
to depend upon the production of sugar.
The cultivation of sugar creates internal problems within
Cuban society. The sugar harvest requires seasonal labor. There
fore, a vast number of Cuba's agricultural labor force was left
unemployed for msuiy months during the year. Furtheraore, the
cultivation of sugar requires large tracts of land if a sugar
plantation is to be run efficiently. The result of this require
ment was the uneven distribution of land ownership, leaving a
majority of peasants landless.
The Castro regime faced these problems by establishing the
Institute Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (INRA). Agricultural
planning was formulated and implemented in the towering headquarters

Andre6 Bianchi, "Agriculture," in Cuba, The Economic and
Social Revolution, ed. by Dudly Seers (North Carolina, the University of North Carolina Presss I96L), p. 98.
29lbid., p. 99.
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of IMM located in the capital city. The agency was headed by
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a leading Cuban communist for more than
thirty years.He operated an agency which included departments
concerned with land, production, trade affairs, agricultural
machinery, and agricultural credit. From Havana, proposed programa
of IMRA were initiated throi^h twenty-eight agricultural zones.
Within each zone, an IMM delegate was installed under the title
of Chief of Zone,^^
This description represented the proposed structure of
agricultural control. It becomes very easy to utilize this
description in forming an image of a very efficient, rigidly
controlled operation. However, a visit to both INRÂ headquarters
as well as to the various agricultural zones serves as a modi
fication to this image,
Karl E, Meyer describes a correspondent's visit to the national
headquarters of INRi, The correspondent was greeted by a sign
over a functionary's desk stating, "Be Brief,

We Are Fifty Years

B e h i n d , W h i l e the correspondent was conducting his interview,
r'
a messenger from Cuba's national bank arrived to pick up a check
for $100,000, No one could find the check. A cluttered desk
was ransaked and finally the check was found. Before the corres
pondent could continue, a school teacher entered the headquarters

3%atthews. Return to Cuba, p. 5.
^^Bianchi, p, 105.
32Karl E. Meyer, "Castro's Cuba," Progressive 2k (May, I960), p.
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carrying a paper bag filled with coins. The teacher explained
that his pupils had contributed the coins for agrarian reform.
All work in the office was halted,

With due ceremony, the bag

was placed on the director's desk and everyone in the office
commenced counting,^3
The authority granted to the chiefs of Bone colors any image
we may have of an organized pyramid of control operating from the
top downwards. Each chief was expected to accept responsibility,
to see what had to be done and to do it on his own initiative,
Each chief was granted broad authority in all matters relating to
economic and social development in his area. Funds were placed
at his disposal by the national office of I-IRA and the chiefs
were given considerable leeway in determining how these funds
were to be spent,
Of course, lîJHA headquarters kept contact with these zone
chiefs. It assigned provincial delegates whose authority extended
over several zones.

Coordination was maintained through periodic

meetings in Havana attended by the directors of INRA's national
headquarters, the provincial supervisors, and the zone

delegates.36

INM, under Castro's direction, initiated, organized, and
implemented the first program of agrarian reform in 1959.

33ibld.
3^Zeitlln and Scheer, Tragedy in Our Hemisphere, p, 160,

35Bianchi, p, 105.
3^bid.
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According to this program, which warn formalized in the First Law
of Agrarian Reform, landboldlnga were limited to a maximum of
3,^00 acres for oattle, eugar, and rice, and 90G acrea for other
uses.

However, under no oircnmetances could a private indi

vidual own more than l,3b2 acres. Privately owned land lAlcb
exceeded the law's limitations would be expropriated.

According

to this law, owners of this land would receive compensation. They
would be paid in twenty-year bonds at an annual interest rate
of U.5 per cent. The value of the land would be determined by
the evaluation of the land according to the taxes paid on the
land.
It proves to be very interesting to investigate the actual
operations of IHHA in the process of expropriating landholdings.
According to Theodore Draper, a representative of INBA, accom
panied by two armed soldiers, presented himself at a privately
owned farm whose boundaries exceeded the limits set by the govern
ment, The delegate announced that the government was taking all
but a certain portion of the land. Although the stipulations of
the Agrarian Reform law did not include farm machinery or live
stock, these too were often appropriated. The delegate then set
a price for the confiscated land. If the owner accepted the price,
he was paid immediately in cash. If he did not accept the price,
his land was still appropriated and he was left without recourse

37Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," p. 17,
^Gsianohl, p. 101.
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to appeal. The entire operation was carried on in a very onbusiness-like manner. The government delegate made no inven
tories, The landowner received no receipt. The government bonds
39
mentioned in the Agrarian Reform Act were not issued,-^
The government disposed of the expropriated land in two ways.
The first manner involved the granting of this land to private
individuals. Renters, share-croppers, and squatters were given
first priority in receiving this government land, a grant of
26,6 hectares.

However, the second manner of disposing of the

land received governmental preference. This was the program of
distributing land to agricultural cooperatives.^0 INRA was
Instructed by the regime to promote cooperative farms whenever
possible. These cooperatives were placed under the control of
IWRft who appointed managers for each cooperative farm and supplied
credit.Coordination was established by giving the cooperative

managers the responsibility of correlating their programs with the
zone chiefs.
Each cooperative cost the Cuban government $100,000, which
was utilized to provide capital, machinery, and fertilizers. It
was expected that the cooperatives would pay this investment
back to the INRA, Beyond this, surplus profits would be plowed

3?Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," p. 17,
(tOBianchi, p. 102.
i&Ibld.
k^Ibld., p. 106,
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back into the cooperative. The workers built their new houses and
schools with their own hands with technical aid and raw materials
provided by the state.^^ All produce was to be turned over to
INHA which then marketed it.^b

Wages were determined by dividing

the money made by the cooperatives equally among the workers.
The organizational pattern of control within each cooperative
involved the manager and a general assembly of the workers. The
manager was appointed by the state as lîiHA's official representa
tive, The farmers of the cooperative met in a general assembly
once each year to elect a directing board to represent them in
the making of administrative decisions affecting the cooperative.
This seven-man board accepted responsibility for production,
supplies, education, machinery, housing, and personnel involved
in cooperative living,
The government was vitally concerned with the choice of
crops to be grown on the cooperatives. Sugar cooperatives were
created. However, the government placed special emphasis upon
the development of crop diversification. Cane fields were
uprooted and the Cubans were encouraged to grow such crops as
tobacco, coffee, and peanuts. The regime felt that with govern
ment encouragement agricultural production could be liberated
from the chains of monoculture*

^3«Guba in mid-Revolution," Economist 198 (January 1, 1961), p
WtDraper, "The Runaway Revolution," p. 17,
^^Bianchi, p, 109,
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From 1959 to 1961 the cooperatives functioned as an integral
component of agricultural production in Cuba.

However, in 1961

the cooperative form of farm organ!wtlon began to be assailed
by the regime. Why?
The organizational blueprint for organizing and managing
the cooperatives was not successful. Adequate accounting systems
had not been utilized by the cooperatives. Statistical records
were not available to aid in the formation of agricultural plans,
Furthermore, the regime charged the cooperatives with exploiting
nonmexmbers hired at harvest time.

According to INRA, cooperative

managers had contributed to the general failure by not performing
their jobs efficiently and effectively. The list of charges also
included the accusation that the cooperatives had engaged in the
black marketing of scarce produce.^7
In the final analysis, the regime decided that the coopera
tive system of organization was not capable of providing a strong
base for economic growth. Therefore, a new plan was formulated
stressing agricultural production organized according to the
Soviet model of state farms. Two hundred and sixty state farms
were create in 1961. The regime cloaked this change over in an
ideological justification. The state farm system would better
serve revolutionary justice since workers would receive equal
pay for equal work. This method of payment far surpassed the

U6ibid., p, 122.
^^Hispanic American Report, 1$ (October, 1962), p, 106,
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cooperative method of dividing the pi^fits among the workers.
The regime declared that the cooperative method was unfair since
profits depended upon land productivity, which varied. The
injustice would be corrected through worker employment on state
farme,^ Within a short period of time, these state farms were
employing over 100,000 workers. The farms were run by managers
appointed by INHA, By 1962 special departments concerned with
the administration of state farms were established in the regional
offices of INRA.^

The government had become the largest employer

of farm labor in Cuba.
With the establishment of state farms, however, agricultural
reappraisal was far from over. Three years after the agrarian
reform was officially started, total farm output had fallen below
the level of the years before the revolution. Again the regime
had to face the problem of answering the question, why? INBA
was still crippled in formulating production plans by the lack of
statistics. Since equijgment maintenance programs had not been
utilized, farm machinery had deteriorated and the regime could not
secure new parts. Finally, the managers of the state farms were
often young and inexperienced and had made too many planning
mistakes. The end result of these combined conditions was the
creating of a low productivity level. In 1962 reappraisal began
again, IMRA began to stress the need of keeping accounting

^^Bianchi, p. 123.
%bid., p. 12b.
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records, managers were replaced, and finally, IHRâ decided that
the Cuban economy was not ready for the strains of crop diversi
fication, Sugar would again receive the emphasis of agricultural
planning.50

The regime coupled its program of state farms with the for
mation of the National Association of Small Farmers (AHAP), This
association represented a concession on the part of the agricul
tural planners to the private sector of the farm economy,^ The
association was charged by INRA. to encourage the small farmer
to direct his production according to IMM programs.Never
theless, the law recognized the existence of the private sector
of agricultural production.
The free landholder in Cuba was restricted by certain
government regulations.

He was allowed by the regime to market

one-fourth of his produce privately if he was able to transport
and market the goods himself.5%

However, these 200,000 small

farmens had to sell the remaining three-fourths of their crop
to the government at fixed prices. They received their supplies
from INRA country stores. The government owned about one thousand
of these stores, which were operated according to policies which

%bid.. p. 11:2.
^Ibld.. p. 122.
%bld.. p. 125.

53«iihen The Daiquiris Ran Out," Economist, 206 (March 23,
1963), p. 1096.
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fostered underselling to drive all competitive stores from the
market.
However, the small farmer received a personal guarantee of
the protection of hia existence from the lider.

According to

Castro, the small private farmer would not be pushed out by
large-scale state agriculture. He promised that the proportion
of state land to small farms would be stabilized at between sixty
to seventy per cent state land to thirty to forty per cent small
farms.
This promise was formalized in the Second Agrarian Reform
Law. The provisions of this law stated that the ratio of state
owned land to that owned by small farmers would be seventy per
cent state to thirty per cent private. In addition, the law
provided for the nationalization of land holding of over 33 1/3
acres. The owners of expropriated land which had been cultivated
would receive an indemnity of fifteen pesos monthly per acre of
land. The owners of unused land would receive no compensation.
This law was aimed at destroying medium landholdings.

But in

essence, its provisions did protect the small farmer whose
original title to 33 1/3 acres had been given him by the govern
ment.
By the end of 1962, IKRA was formulating agricultural programs

^^Manchi, p, 126.
^^Hispanic American Report, 16 (October, 1963), p, 765,
^6Hispanic American Report, 16 (December, 1963), p. 961.
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based upon a stress on sugar production.

The government created

a National Sugar Commission with boards at the provincial levels.
Members of these boards represented the Ministry of Industries,
INRà, MAP, and the anions of agricultural and sugar workers.
The Commission and the boaMs were to work together to promote
coordination between all government bodies involved in sugar
production.
By early 1963 the government was espousing the following
slogans
The highest honor to the martyrs of the 26th of
July is to arrive at July 26 with all our cane fields
free of weeds.58
The Castro regime faced the revolutionary challenge of
converting a capitalistic system of agricultural production into
a socialist type. The methods of the transformation involved
two Agrarian Reform Laws, the expropriation of lands, the estab
lishment of cooperatives, their conversion into state farms, and
finally, a mild form of encouragement to small farmers.
To complete the analysis of the industrial and agricultural
sectors of the Cuban economy, it is necessary to describe the
government's role in directing and controlling the flow of
capital within and between these sectors. This is a two sided
coin involving the flow of small as well as large amounts of
money through the economy. The first side of the coin, the flow

57aianohl, p. Ib7.
5%ispanic American Report, 16 (September, 1963), p. 675.
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of small amounts of money, Involves a description of the govern
ment's control over both wages and prices. Government programs
of social improvement created a situation in which the average
Cuban had more money to spend.

Redaction of unemployment, lowering

of rents and prices, and the establishment of a minimum wage brought
about an increase in the demand for goods. The Cuban had money
to spends

therefore, larger amounts of small capital should

have begun circulating through the economy. However, a compli
cation arose which greatly colored the situation. The failure
of proposed industrial plans created a shortage of consumer goods.
Through the success of government programs, the Cuban had money
to spend. But because of the failure of other government economic
programs, he had little to spend it on,^^
In investigating the second side of the coin, the flow of
large amounts of capital, we become concerned with the area of
Investment capital. In this area, Cuba's revolutionary government
was deeply involved. The principle source of financing capital
Investment within Cuba was the National Treasury, which utilized
a nationalized banking system. Industrial and agricultural profits
and foreign loans were deposited in the National Treasury and
then distributed as needed in the economy.

From this source

came the funds which were used to maintain as well as to expand
industrial and agricultural production,^

S&Nolff, p, 320,

%bld., p. 311,
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Industry and agriculture are two components of Cuba's
economic system. The third component is labor, including men
and their organization into unions and the relationship which
existed between labor and the state between the years 1959 to I96L.
The situation of labor unions before Castro's takeover was
one engulfed in corruption and involved with gangsterism. Unions
were used as instruments by the government to control the workers.
By tradition and habit, the Cuban workers were accustomed to
government control.Therefore, the first acts of the Castro
regime, acts of direct interference with labor organizations,
caused little surprise to the Cuban workers. Programs of nation
alization placed the Castro government in the position of being
the leading employer of Cuban labor» This situation created
the need to require all union leadership to profess loyalty to
the regime."' Moderate labor leaders were pui^ed and replaced
by government men. For example, Jesus Soto, am extreme leftist,
was installed as head of the national labor confederation, Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba, (CTC).^^
An understanding of the relationship between labor and the
state requires an examination of labor organization in Castro's
Cuba from 1959 to 1961*. Employees had to belong to industrial

^%aurice Zeitlin, "Labor in Cuba," The Nation, 195 (October
20, 1962), p. 21*1.
Hispanic American Report. Ih (February, 196I), p. 879,
%bid.
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unions. There was a union in each plant «3d a national union for
each industry*

This pattern of organization was topped on the

national level by the CTG, the central labor organization.^
Th#r* were twenty-five national labor unions in Cuba which wei%
each represented on the Executive Committee of CTG.^^
Union elections were held in Cuba in October, 1961, Each
factory elected a union section committee and delegates to a
national union congress. Two million persons participated in the
elections.^ Only in a few of these factories were there genuine
elections in which several candidates were nominated and cam
paigned for union office. In most of these elections, one
candidate was nominated for each office by the government's rep
resentatives. A general assembly of the workers confirmed the
nomination, ifowever, other candidates could have been nominated
if the workers had so wished. No direct pressure was applied by
the government to prevent such nomination, Cuban workers, con
ditioned by a long history of government control-, did not choose
to exercise such initiative even though the elections 'uere
carried out by secret ballot and each ballot had a space provided
for write-in candidates,
According to Zeitlin, the woricers had a "naive faith" in the

^Hispanic American Report, lU (October, 1961), p, 69b.
6^Zeitlln, "Labor in Cuba," p. 2bl.
^Hispanic Ameri.can Report, lU (December, 1961), p. 892,
&7zeitlin, "Labor in Cuba," p. ZU.,
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union organization sponsored by the Castro regime. The revolution
had effectively eliminated corruption from the labor movement.
The workers had no desire to create an independent organizational
weapon of their unions,^
The successful management of labor by the Castro regime was
al8o implemented by the creation of Grievance Commissions within
each factory to handle complaints directly at the local level.
These Grievance Commissions were composed of five-men boards,
two men representing the factory administration, one representing
the Ministry of Labor, and two represen^ng the factory work
force. These commissions decided such questions as individual
grievances concerning wages, working hours, or working conditions.
If the workers were not satisfied with a coawission's decision,
they could appeal the case to an Appeals Commission or directly
to the Ministry of Industry.Cuban workers appeared to be very
satisfied with the operation of these commissions.
Labor independence was limited by two methods. The first
method involved programs of indoctrination sponsored by the
government. These indoctrination programs were aimed at training
the worker to promote production without the rewards of higher
wages. The program was christened, "emulacion socialista".^®
The goal of the progrma was to increase production under a

68lbid.
69lbid., p. 2i&0.
70Ibid.
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socialistic system stimulated by the example of outstandingly
dedicated workers. The Cuban worker was trained to accept his
participation in emulacion as a moral obligation. He was taught
to dedicate his efforts to transform his work into a direct
service for his country. This attitude was nurtured and fostered
in special government classes conducted in each factory.The
workers were strongly encouraged to attend these classes. The
worker who refused would be subject to indirect social pressures
but not to direct force.
Government control was also exercised through the issuance
of labor work books. These cards showed the grade of skill of
the worker and his standard wage. The government had justified
the issuance of these cards by stating that they served as a
source of information on the distribution of labor and on the flow
of labor from one section to another to provide a means of pre
venting labor shortages in key sectors. In actual operation, the
cards facilitated the government's control of the labor force.
No one could get a job, quit, or change employait without one
of these work cards. In order to acquire a card, the worker had
to fill out a very detailed and specific questionnaire. These
questionnaires were filed to implement governmental control over
the worker.

Tllbid.
^^''Unionist Are No Real Prop for Castro," Business Week,
(October 27, 1962), p. 119.
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The Ministry of Labor issued these labor cards, The position
whlob the Ministry of Labor occupied within the Cuban revolutionary
system was a very strong one»

Since March 11, I960, the national

labor confederation, CTC, no longer possessed the right to nego
tiate with factory administrators. The Ministry of Labor possessed
this right. In addition, this government agency was given full
authority to settle any labor controversy.^^ Therefore, we may
conclude that Cuba's controlled unions stood in second place
behind the Ministry of La tor.
What have been the results of Castro's labor planning and
control? Through revolutionary programs, which built workers'
centers, nurseries for working mothers, and educational facilities,
the Cuban worker benefited,Also, there were significant gains
in employment. Workers were employed more regularly in revolu
tionary Cuba. Therefore, the majority of Cuban workers became
fervent supporters of Castro and bis government in spite of the
government programs which made the worker subject to governmental
controls both in securing and keeping a job.
In summation, we may conclude that the Castro government
involved itself directly in labor relations by acting in three
roles. The regime was directly involved in union affairs through
its control of the CTC and individual unions. The goverrwent was
directly involved in the area of employer-employee relations since

^^Hispanic American Report, 13 (April, I960), p. 21*0.
^^Zeitlin, "Labor in Cuba," p, 239.
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it became the chief employer in Cuba,

Ninety-five per cent of

Cuban industry had been nationalized and seventy per cent of her
agricultural production had also been nationalized, a condition
which required a large government payroll. Finally, the Cuban
government, under Castro's direction, exercised complete control
over the entire labor structure through the Ministry of Labor.
After describing the Cuban economic system, it now becomes
necessary to correlate the description with our theoretic model,
Frledrich and Brzealnskl have stated that a totalitarian regime
is characterized by the central control and direction of the
entire economy. It may clearly be concluded that the Castro
regime attempted to exercise such central control and direction.
This control was extensive in the areas of labor and industry.
Yet within the area of agricultural production, the regime
limited its control by making concessions to the small farmer of
Cuba,

CHAPTER SU
PATTERNS OF UfE UNDER CASTRO'8 REGIME
In order to understand a society, it is necessary to study
that society's political and economic systems. However, these
systems are cot the total of a society, and an examination of
these areas alone does not contribute to a complete understanding
of everyday living conditions within the social system. To grasp
the complete picture, it becomes necessary to concentrate upon
the social conditions of the society. Therefore, we «ill now
begin to look at the conditions within Cuba which comprise the
elements of the Cuban citizen's daily life. This study will
examine the living conditions, the role of religion within the
society, the nature of the society's communications system, edu
cation, and the role of associational groups. Placed against our
working model of totalitarianism, the study of Cuban society must
also include a search for terroristic methods of control and, if
found, a description of this control and a discussion of reactions
which such control stimulates within the society.
During the time period with which this study is concerned,
the Cuban citizen's living conditions were closely related to the
government's programs for expanded industrialization and agrarian
reform. These expanrive progrmns greatly disrupted the Cuban
economic system. The premature shift of emphasis from sugar
87
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production, the over-night creation of cooperatives, and the
sharp shift to state farms contributed to the fall in agricul
tural production,

Cubans were left facing shortages in both

industrial and agricultural production. The Castro government
was forced to resort to a system of rationing.
Government plans were formulated by which basic food commodi
ties were rationed to the Cuban people.

Each Cuban was allowed

twelve ounces of meat a week, two ounces of butter a month, six
e^;g£ per month, half a pound of fish every fifteen days, one and
a half pounds of beans a month, and six pounds of rice each month.
Children under seven received one quart of ailk per day, while
for all others, the milk ration was one-fifth of a quart per day.
Laundry soap, hand soap, detergents, tooth paste, and shoes ware
also rationed,^

However, fresh fruits, sugar, coffee, and many

vegetables were available without any ration limitations,^
American visitors to Cuba have reported the results of the
rationing system. According to observers like Hugh B, Chester,
Herbert Matthews, and Barbara Skelton, the Cuban people did not
show any signs of malnutrition. No one in Cuba was starving,3
The Cuban diet was monotonous, but it was sufficient. In

^"Ouba Today—Red, Broke, and Hungry,"
Report, S2 (March 26, 1962), p, la.

US Mews and World

^Hugh B, Chester, "Cuba Today," Progressive, 26 (September,

1962), p. la,
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revolutionary Cuba, children were especially well-fed.^ In spite
of the rationing, Chester concludes that the average Cuban was
eating more food than at any time before the Castro revolution.^
Since Castro and his ministers also lived on the ration, the Cuban
people, especially the peasants, felt that for the first time in
Cuba, equal distribution of goods was contributing to a system of
social justice.&
Several revolutionary laws affected the average Cuban's
living conditions. In early 1959, electric rates were reduced
by one half. Telephone rates were also reduced. In addition,
the revolutionary law of March 6, 1957» the Rent Law, reduced by
fifty per cent the rent of all Cubans who earned less than one
hundred pesos per month.^

Housing improvements were further

extended by the building programs in the cooperatives and state
farms. Finally, revolutionary programs to distribute free medical
care to Cuban workers and peasants have contributed to the improve
ment of the living conditions of the poorer classes of Cuban
society.®
In analyzing the life of the average Cuban under the Castro
regime, we have described living conditions. Including food

^îatthews. Return to Cuba, p. 6.
^Chester, p, Ul.
^Ibid.
%orray, p, 2U.
^Nolff, p. 318.
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available, housing, and medical care. The description must now
be extended to include an analysis of the role of religion within
Castro's Cuba. Out of a population of seven million people,
around six and one-half million Cubans were baptized Catholic,
including Castro, himself.^ The study of practicing, func
tioning religion within Castro's Cuba is a study of a two-sided
coin, one side reflecting coexistence with the regime, the other,
religious restrictions imposed by the government.
A partially tolerant attitude toward religion was reflected
in Herbert Matthews' quote of Castro's words: "I don't care
whether a person is religious or not or what his religion is."10
Such an attitude was more forcefully espoused by Castro in his
speech given on the anniversary of the attack on Batista's palace
led by Jose Antonio Echeverria. The chairman of the ceremonial
y
was quoting from one of Echeverria's speeches. This chairman
%

deliberately eliminated the following sentence from Echeverria's
original speech. "We are confident that the purity of our inten
tions will bring us the favor of God to achieve a reign of justice
in our land."H This omission infuriated Castro, who immediately
delivered an entire speech based upon the deleted sentence.
Can we be so cowardly, so mentally crippled, that we
have the moral poverty to suppress three lines?...
We Icnow that a Revolutionary csm have a religious belief.

^Hispanic American Report, 13 (October, I960), p. 526.
^^îiatthews. Return to Cuba, p. 13.
l^reene, "Return to Cuba," p. 18.
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The Revolution does not force men, it does not intrude
into their personal beliefs. It does not exclude anyone,
The Vatican did not break diplomatic relations with Havana,
There was an Inter-Nuncio in Havana and a Cuban Ambassador at
the Holy See,^^ When the Nuncio vas celebrating the coronation
of Pope Paul VI, Castro paid him a courtesy visit which lasted for
an hour and a half.^
A further example of the coexistence of religion with the
Castro regime «as the fact that churches were open in revolutionary
Cuba and they were crowded,1^ In addition, church members read
a regular column of Catholic news in one of Havana's newspapers.
An occasional article by a Protestant pastor was also

printed.

Conflicts between organized religion and the Castro regime
appeared to be centered in the area of education. The regime had
condemned the teaching of religion in schools.

This condemnation

culminated in the nationalization in 1961 of all private schools.
Teachers and directors of private schools were allowed to continue
at their jobs, but they became subject to state direction and not
to their religious orders,

^Ibid.
l^Ibld.
%bld.
l^Carl Migdail, "After Five and one-half years of Communism—
How Cuba Looks Today," US News and world Report. 57 (August 31, 196lt),
p. 36.
^^«Cuba Paints Its Own Shade of Red," Business Week, (June 13, 196U),
p. it6,
l^Hispanic American Report, lii (July, 1961), p. 1*08.
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Following an anti-government demonstration in front of a
Catholic church in Havana, Auxiliary Bishop Mwardo Boza Masvidad
and one hundred and tM.rty-five priests were arrested and deported
to Spain, Bishop Masvidad and forty-six of the priests were Cuban
citizens.^®

Castro made the further announcement that all priests

who were foreign born and had been demonstrating an antl-govemment attitude while In Cuba would be forced to leave the country.
However, he also stated that foreign-bom priests who cooperated
with the revolution would be allowed to stay.^^
Catholic leaders in turn responded to the government's action,
Archbishop of Santiago, Enrique Perez Serantes, in mid-1960 issued
a pastoral letter which condemned the Castro government's shift
OQ
toward the left.
However, the Church did not decide to take
any direct action against the government. The Catholic Church
possessed the dj.rect weapon of exccsnmunication. According to
Canon Law, the act of impeding or imprisoning Roman Catholic
Bishops is an act which Incurs excommunication. Since Castro and
his officials have committed this act, they became subject to
the excommunication^^ However, the Church did not make public any
such action and appeared to be avoiding the entire issue.
It may be concluded that the Catholic Church in revolutionary

^^liispanie American Report, 1# (November, 1961), p. 790»
Hispanic American Report, Ik (July, 1961), p. ii08«
^^Hispanic American lleport, 13 (July, I960), p. 310.
ZlHispanlc American Report, Ig (March, 1962), p. 31.
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Cuba was allowed to function in its capacity as director of
religious functions. But its influence was allowed to include
only religious matters. The regime would not tolerate its inter
ference in the fields of either education or politics.
As religion is an intricate component of social life so are
communications. The communication system, including press, radio,
television, and movies, was colored and modified by the rule of
the Castro regime. For example, in December, 1959, the eve of
Castro's victory, there were sixteen daily newspapers in Havana,
After the Castro victory, five of these newspapers, EL Pais,
Excelsior, Manana, Olarlo Hacional, and Republica were closed,
The remaining papers fell under complete government control.
Revolucion was created as the semi-official newspaper of the 26th
of July Movement, Hoy, the organ of the Cuban communist party,
was allowed to publish by Castro without any interference,^^
Gradually, the total number of newspapers coming off the
Cuban presses began to dwindle. Their editors, such as Jorge
Zayas and Jose Ignancio Rivero, went into exile. This dwindling
of newspapers and the exile of editors reflected the reaction to
the goverrfflient^s enactment of a plan to "free the press," This
government plan allowed newspaper workers to add clarifying state
ments at the end of articles which opposed Castro or his regime.
An example of such notation was piven in the Hispanic American

^^îiispanic American Report, 13 (July, I960), p. 309,
^^Ibid., p. 309.
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Hegorb, According to the inserted ccsament, the particular article
in question . , • "expresaed the views of the newspaper management
but the mployees considered it untrue and not in accordance with
the most elammtal newspaper ethics.
Commenting on this postscript device, the Executive Board of
the Provincial College of Journalists in Havana concluded that
there was freedom of the press in revolutionary Cuba. According
to a statement released by the board,
This freedom is no longer simply for the owner or seller
of Information, but for the journalist, for the manual
worker and intellectual to make known his positima
regarding false, anti-patriotic and tendeoti-ous Informati(m by means of postscript or annotation, a procedure
... that is one of the finest achievements of joumalifflB and freedom of expression.^5
However, the board failed to report that these clarifying ctmamts
have been used only against articles which criticijwd or C(mti%26
dieted the governmental position.
fte Castro government ocmpleted its program of publication
control by finally allowing nothi»^ but pro-government articles
to be printed in the Cuban press. Castro refused to stand for
any cidticism. To facilitate this government control and regula
tion of the Cuban press, a govenment news agency was created,
Prenaa Latina, whose pubHeation set the pattern for what was

^^aispanie Anwilean Report, 13 (March, I960), p. 175.
2$Manuel Urrutia Lleo, Fidel Castro and Co. Inc. (New York*
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964;, p. 89.
2%tiLd., p. 91.
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acceptable printing matter in Cuba»

AU other Cuban newspapers

were placed under the control of a central propagmda directorate.^^
It ma^ be clearly conclMed that there was actually no freedm of
the press in Castro's Cuba.
The movie induati^, television, and radio were also subject
to governmental regulation within revolutionary Cuba. Institute
Cmbano del Arto Industria Cinmatograficos (ICAIC) was granted
the authority to declare films counterrevolutionary. Such HIbs
trere not allowed to be shmm.^^

Castro justified this action by

stating that Cuba was in a revolutionary stage and since films
wield such a powerful Influence, they must be in accord with
revolutionary principles.
Furthezw)re, radio broadcasting stations were also subject
to government control. TWy praised Castro and his government and
never indulged their facilities in the field of political criticima.
MLth tbm seizure of CMQ Channel Six, the last independent station,
all television channels became subject to government control.^
Radio and televiid-on stations were directed by the central direc
torate which also supervised press publications.^
A controlled system of communications, including press, radio,

27Max Frankel, "Case Study of a Police State," New Yoric Times
Magazine. (April 30, 1961), p. 88.
^®Iliaabeth Sutherland# "Letter From Havana," Nation, 193
(November h, 1961), p. 358.
^^Hlspfflttic American Report. 13 (March, I960), p. 175.
^^Frankel, p. 88.
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and television, provides a transmission belt for the goverment
to use in transmitting policies to the people. The proo##e aî
transmitting broad general goals is best performed through the
society's educational system. Therefore, it becomes vital to
investigate Cuba's educational goals, programs, and operating
fmoiliti##.
In 1961, the Castro regime faced the problem of dealing with
one million illiterates in a population of seven million.^ Ihs
Castro governsfflttt, operating through Armando Hart's Ministry of
Education, began to formulate plîms to correct this situation.
Two extreme approaches were utilized. At one extreme, Fidel
Castro, Haul Castro, Che Guevara, and other leading government
officials became teachers. On television, on radio, and at mass
meetings these men became patient instructors, explaining history
and economics to the Cuban people.

Their work could be considered

as a method of making gmeral backgroimd knowledge available to
the people#

At the other extreme, illiteracy was attacked by

seaSing an army of young volunteers to live with Cuba's peasants
and to teach.
Castro christened 1961 as the "Year of Education."

At his

0(mmand all Cuban yomgsters between the sixth grade and high
school left their Havana homes to go to the interior of Cuba

3lEliaabeth Sutherland, "Castro's Work for the Peasants,"
Manchester Guardian Weekly, 85 (December lU, 1961), p. 7.
^^HacGaffey and Bamett, p. 286.
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where they spent eight months working with Cuba's Illiterate
adult peasants.33 in order to facilitate this program, Cuba's
grammar and secondary schools were closed two months ahead of
schedule and remained closed until December, 1961,3^
By February, 1962, Education Minister Hart reported that as
a result of the work performed by thousands of Cuba's very young
teachers, some 707,000 persoma bad been trained to read and
write. Illiteracy had been reduce to 3,9 per cent.3^ These
peasants were far from being fully educated, but at least they
had attained a first or second grade level of literacy. The
govemnent immediately set to woric establishing follow-up schools
to continue the training of these peasants. By November, 1962,

36
Loo,(XX) adults were enrolled in these follow-up schools.
Educational programs for adults were expanded beyond tW
literacy campaigns. Special educational programs were established
in Cuban factories. By 1962, 100,000 adults were @3rolled in these
worfcer improvement schools and an additional 50,0CK) adults were
enrolled in night schools located on the state farms.3^
For the youth of Cuba, the Castro government spared no effort
on behalf of their education and welfare.

ïoung people were

33»Co0BBie8 and Cub Scouts," America, 105 (April 1, 1961), p. 2.
3^Hi8panic American Report, Ik (May, 1961), p. 217.
3^Hi8panic American Report, 1& (February, 1962), p. IC^O.
36Hi8panlc American Report, l5 (November, 1962), p. 806.
37ibid.
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tzwiaported from Cuba's interior, given shoes and clothing, and
were lodged in the confiscated mansions located in Havana or in
speciallf built camps.

At government expense, the students #ere

well fed. Their educational curriculum was based upon concentrated
courses in technical subjects. In 196ii, there were about 100,000
scholarship students.^ Also the government issued $,000 special
scholarships for medical and engineering studies to graduates of
basic secondary schools.Also, equal educational opportunities
extended to women, Negroes, and mulattoes. The University
of Havana, which in pre-revolution days had a student body composed
of only t«i per cent girls, had a student body with forty per cent
girls in 196L. It also had a far higher percentage of Negroes
and mulattoes than before the revolution.^® In addition,
extensive building programs increased the number of secondazy
and eleraentary schools in revolutionary Cuba.^
The preceding description illustrates the active role of tM
Cuban government in the implementation of educational Improvements.
This description leads to the question of the degree to which
political considerations are involved in Cuba's present educational
system. An introductory anmmr to this question was provided
in tlm official report by the OuWm goverment to the UNESCO

3%igdail, p. iiO.
^^Hlspanic American fleport, l5 (January, 1963), p. lOC^.
^%atthews. Return to Cuba, p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 9.
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Goaferenee on EdiicaW-on and Eeoncœrf.c and Social Development held
In Santiago, Chile in 1962,
The aim of education in the New Cuba include these of
instilling in our children and young people an uxureserved
love for their country and a sense of solidarity with the
wrknrs and peoples of all lands in their noble struggle
for a free and happy life, and of teaching them to abhor
imperialist wars of plunder and to strive steadfastly
for peace.^2
According to Richard Jolly, the intention to use the Cubm
educational system for political purposes was openly declared
by the Castro

regime.Curriculum

planning was orientated

around a base of Marxist indootrination.This was coupled with
teaching a love for Fidel Castro in Cuba's classrooms. According
to Education Minister Armando Hart, "Evm in arithrotic class
teachers have to preach loyalty to fldel,"^^
The government exercised its contTOl over the complete struc
ture of Cuban education through a centralized board of advisors
in Havana, which worked under Castro's supervision. The influence
of the Havana board extended even to the level of daily lesson
plans used in Cuban classrooms. The board issued model lesson
plans wiaich teachers and local administrator* had to use. All
textbooks had to receive the approval of the board.

These lesson

bZaichard Jolly, "Education," in Cuba. The Econome and Soci&l
Evolution, ed. by Dudly SeeM (Horth Carolina: the ijnivemity
o^ North ^rolina Press, 196&), p. 3U9.
Wlbid., p. 3U6.
^Aîrrutia, p. 96.
kSprankel, p. 89.
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plans and tœKtbooks placed special emphasis upon government
approved ideology and programs directed to foster nationalism,^^
Schools of Hevoltitlonarj Instruction irtiich specialised in
the teaching of the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism were
established throughout Cuba. The course offered by these schools
was three months long. Classes took place during the evening
to facilitate the attendance of working adults.Teachers, of
course, were encouraged to attend such classes. In addition,
teachers were provided with a gowmwent-issued handbook, Alfabetic«08, the contents of which were strongly politically
oriented.^
Indoctrination proceeded from teacher to pupil, Richard
Jolly illustrates the nature of this indoctrinaW.on by pmviding
examples of questions used in Cuban textbooks. For example, in
an arithmetic textbook, the following question was asked*
The Ku ELux Klan was founded in the US in 1886 to
maintain by terror the suprem^y of the white race.
For how many years has this infamous society existed
in our neighbor's land?w9
A further example of this indoctrlnatlm was seen in an
SKerclae given in 7encerem>s« a pH.mr for Cuban youngsters. The
exercise involved having the students read and then write words

à6î4acGaffey and Banaett, p. 286.
^7jolly, p. 207.
W
^9ibid., p. 363.

am
or sentences. One eamrclee was built around the phrase, "Toung
and old united, we swear with Fidel, to defend Cuba together»

We

shall never be defeated,*50
Govenment regulatory program* extended to the currioiilum
and faculty of the Dniversity of Havana.

The Havana University

had enjoyed a traditional autonos^y, an autonomy which facilitated
young Castro's rebellioue activities against Batista «hUe Castro
was attending the University law school, Castro now declared
that all teachers and students in the University who disagreed
with government programs would be dimissed.^^
¥e may now formulate a conclusion frcws this description of
education under the Castro regime. Educational facilities wem
expended and improved under Castro's direction. But this expani
sion and improvement served as instruments of governmental control
over the society.
To understand social conditions in Cuba our study must be
«Kpanded from an analysis of educational facilities to a descrip
tion of the status of associatdonal groups in Castro's Cuba,
Associational groups went through two stages in revolutionary
Cuba, The first stage involved the destruction of pre-revoluM-onary groups. Most of the associations whose membership was
rooted in tM upper and middle classes disappeared. Only the
profesadonal associations were left, but their organizations

%hd.d.. p. 358,
^Frankel, p, 88
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were modified by governmental action.

Within each professional

assoeiatdon, a board of directors ms appointed by the government.
This board operated as a revolutionary tribunal which worked to
disqualify from professional practice any person accused of
counterrevolutionaiy activity.

The tribunal of the Havana

association of lawyers had expelled sixty member# by July, I960.
The Havana medical tribunal suspended annual medical convention#
and also expelled several member# from practicing in Havana because
of their political beliefs. Similar action occurred in the asso
ciations for jouïîialists, radio announcers, public accountants,
and engineers.^^
In 1962, the Cuban Masonic Association was the recipient of
violent government action. Cuban troops occupied the Masonic
temple in Havana and arrested several Masonic leaders including
the Grand Master.^ Cuban adHtiaiaen also occupied the head
quarters of the Knights of Columbus, the Catholic Labor Association,
and the Catholic Laymen's Lodge,
The second stage in the changing status of associational
groups in Castro's Cuba was the formation of several governmentsponsored organizations. For example, the Federation of Cuban
Women, formed from existing women's organizations by the wives

^^Mae^affey and itomett, p. 279.
%bld.,

p.

280.

^Hispanic American Report, 1$ (*îovmnber, 1962), p. 805.
^^Hispanic American Report, 13 (January, 1961), p. 786.
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of Ra.t^ Castro and Gh# Guevara, «as created. An oi^anisation
entitled the National Front of Professional Um and Technicians
was fomed. Finally, the organizational structure included two
assodational groups for young peoples

the Association of ïouag

Rebels, for youth raaging in age from fourteen to twenty-five,
and the Union of Rebel Pioneers, for children of seven to fourtem
years of age,^^
At the apex of government-sponsored organizational activity
was placed the Cuban militia, the orgmnimatlon which gave to the
men mû women wto did not fight in the Sierra Maestre a sense of
direct participation in the revolutionary victory. According to
Samuel Shapiro, who tmveled through the provinces of Cuba in
1962, he was almost never out of sight of an armed man or womm,
"Every office building, every hotel, bus station, residential
block, and factory is guarded by olive drab militiamen 1A0 have
rifles or machine guns and know how to use thwB,"^^ Shapiro met
teenagers able to take anti-aircraft guns apart and put thm
together again. He also described meeting a sixty-fin^ year old
grandmother shouldering a rifle. These militiamen believed they
were defeMing Cuba from her memies and an ene^ was anyone,
national or foreigner, who opposed M.d^.
The government strongly enoouz%ged the Cuban pecpls to belong

^%acOaffey and Baraett, p. 281,
^^Smuel Shapiro, *Cuba Today Eyewitness Report," The Ration.
195 (September, 1962), p. 150,
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to these revolutionary oi%amlmations. A citizen who refueed to
parM-cipate was reflecting by his actions a disloyal attitude.
Disloyalty would be considered as counterrevoluttonary and could
qualify the individual as being an enemy of the regii^* Conse
quently, membership in these organizations was very extensive.
In studying social conditions in Cuba, m have been slowly
moving up a descriptive pyramid, which Included tW relationship
of the goverommmt to food supplies and general living conditions,
to religion, communications, education, and associations#

finally,

we have reached the top of the pymmld with a description of
police control over the Cuban population. In 1962, Castro estab
lished a Ministry of Interior, giving to this ministry the respon
sibility for maintaining public order. The creation of the
ministry served as a method of centralizing all police units in
Cut» in order to develop a strong and effective security system.
fhe security systm within Cuba operated at both the lower
and higher levels. At the lower levels, the neighborhood base,
were found the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution*
These committees functioned In a watch dog capacity, reporting
disloyal or suspicious action to higher authorities. After the
Bay of Pigs invasion, the lists of suspects turned in by these
defense committees appeared to be the basis for the arrast of

SSpj^mjcel, p. 69.
^^"The Castro Regime in Cuba,* Departf^nt of State, p. 19.
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of several Cubans.^®
Moving up the security structure, we encounter the regular
armed forces which totaled around 100,000 men. This force was
fortified by the

2^0,000

militia member#.^ Finally, we come

to the top of the security system which was occupied by the Gg,
the national Gubm secret police and the investigating corps of
the Cuban government. According to ccœplaints presented to tte
Inter-Aneilcan Commission, Cuban citizens were subject to arbitz%ry arrests by G2 officials. The arrested individual was tMn
transported to the Gg headquarters in Havana where he was isolated
md subject to interrogation involving psychological torture,
Legislation enacted by the Castro regime also contributed
to a society subject to police control. Bevolutionaiy Decree
Number 988 designated five crimes which were punishable by death
within forty-eight hours of capture. The czlaes were:

burning

si%ar cane, aiding GounterTevolutlonari.es, helping traitors from
abroad, acts of sabatoge in Cuban cities, and carrying weapons
without governmental permission,
Tad Sxule chaises that Cubans program of rationing also

^%acGaffey and Bamett, p.

282.

^^ad Szule, "CastroÎ How Strong? How Long?,» New York
Times Magazine, (Septmber 23, 19^), p. 25.
^Report on the Situation of Political Prisoners and Their
Relatives in Cuba, p. 2U.
63HGastro»s Latest» Firing Squads for Farmers," US New
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contributed to effective police control. Each Cuban city dweller
received a ration book which was registered and made available
to the police. This procedure made it impossible for outsiders
to establish residence in the cities without the goveimment'e
knowledge. Thus, underground movements were severely hindered
from developing.^
Thia kind of control was further implemmted by the Law of
Urban Reform of OctoWr, I960. This law prevented citizens from
changing residence without government permission. The Cuban who
wished to move had to secure government authorization from a
Superior CJounsul, the official who administered the Urban Reform
Law»A Cuban caught carrying so much as a chair in a city
street was subject to airest for suspicion of violating the law.
The privacy of the Cuban's residence was challenged by Law
Number k99, involving the control of the Aedes-Aegipti mosquito.
Empowered by tliis law, the Cuban police was granted the authority
to mcerciee unannooneed access to any residence at any hour in
search of the death-carrying mosquito. It has been charged that
the law has been gra^ly abused as machine gun-bearing officers
knocked down doors to search the homes of Cubans suspected of
disloyalty.^
One method which may be used in evaluating the effectiveness

^aule, p. 25»

^%he Castro Regime in Cuba, US Department of State, p. b*
%bid., p. U.
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of this police system is to examine the existence or non-exlsteno®
of effective opposition to the government. An examination of
Castro's Cuba revealed the existence of two types of protest to
government policies. The first type Involved the utilization of
a form of passive resistance. Instead of fleeing to the raotmtains
to wage an active war of opposition against the government, several
thousand CJubans chose simply to leave Cuba#

Freedom Tower in

Havana was the receiving house for the 150,OCX) refugees who left
Cuba, The mental image of a weary traveler dressed in rags and
carrying his few possessions in a bundle would not fit the Cuban
emigre, Ninety-eight per cent of the refugees from Cuba arrived
in Miami by jet. They were clean and well-fed. "They represent
67
Cuba's middle class on the move." '
Fidel Castro did not restrain these people by physical means.
Bach refugee was required by tte Cuban government to leave the
greater part of his poasesrions. He had to pay the Ministry of
Finance twenty-five dollars before departing. Also, the Cuban
who wished to leave his country had to secure a pewit from the
Havana civil service. Only one professional group experienced
extreme difficulty in securing these permits. These were Cuban
doctors, TW regime placed unofficial barracades in the way of
doctors wishing to leave, barricades which made it difficult for
a doctor to secure a permit. However, the large number of Cubans
who successfully secured permits and left Cuba proves that the

67»Refugees from Castro," Eeonomlgt, 205 (December 22, 1962), p. 12di.
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government procedures involved in securing the right to leave
were by no seams insuraountable. If Cubans did not wish to
remain in their country, Castro did not seem to want them,^
Sosie of these Cuban refugees chose to transform their
passive opposition to Castro into an active form after leaving
Cuba. Counterrevolutionary groups were formed in Inland, Mexico
City, and Puerto fiico. The various opposition groups such as
the Directorio Revolucionarlo Eetudiantil sent agents back into
Cuba to conduct anti-government programsj, including urban terrorisa,
to undermine the Caatro regime,^
The exile opposition groups were merged to form the Frente
Democratioo levolucionarlo.

It was this group which operated

under CIA direction to undertake a direct invasion of the Cuban
homeland. Their endeavor ended in seventy-two hours at the Bay
of Pigs in 1961 when Castro squashed the attack,
Since I960, other Cubans dissatisfied with Castro's govern
ment have chosen to oppose him directly by operating within the
country»

Groups of counterrevolutionaries have fled to the

Sierra Maestre and to the Sierra Escambray in Las Villas Province,
These groups have operated much as Castro did during his days in

%bld.. p. 120$.
^"Forgotten Young Men," National Review, 15 (August 13,
1963), p. 105.
7%eith Wheeler, «Hell of a Beating in Cuba," Life. 50
(April 28, 1961), p. 17.
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the Sierra Maestre, eondmcting gmerrllla activities,^ Their
aetivities were extended into urban areas where bcsabinga have
oeeurrcd» It was reported in Ckstober» 19^ that, terroxlsts
attmptW to kill Castro by sprajlng his automobile idth maehine
gun bluets. Reporters have speculated that these GuWa
terrorists have made several attempts to assassinate the Preiser,
but th^ have never been reported in the Cubem press,
Who were these terrorists? the majoiity of the guerrillas,
wkase onaber was estimated at around three hundred wn, were
foraer Castro followers who became dissatisfied with the regime.
They were led by former Castro officers such as Manuel Beaton and
Nino I&amJ)
The effeotivmess of the guerrillas was strcmgly dilutwi
by the results of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The aftermath of
the invasion ma a slovdotm in all counterrevolutionary activity
in Culm* The rebels* organization was weakened by government
arrests and ty a populace which conceived of opposition to tW
Cuban government as being motivated by foreigners. Cuban nation
alisa triumphed over counterrevolutionary activities.
These forms of opposition—refugees, exile groups, suad guer
rilla fighters—were effectively balanced by the groups within

^Hispanic American Report,

13 (November, I960),

p. 6o8.

^^Hispanic American Report,

13 (Decaaber, I960),

p. 696,
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the Cuban society which etrongly supported the govemmmt. First,
there were the young people who were directly benefiting from a
government which meemed dedicated to their welfare. Since onehalf of the population in Cuba was below the age of twenty-five,
this was obviously a trmendous source of strength for the regiw,^^
f

âlso there w@m the Negroes and mulattoes whose members compose
one-fourth of the population. Under the Castro regime, they have
achieved rights equal to those of their fellow Cubans. The public
places of Havana have become filled with them as they «Kercise
their new rights.FinsCLly, there were the poor of Cuba, Accor
ding to Max Frankel, they supported Castro's regime because
"they may get a new house, or because they remember misery and
pilsons md torturesThey might not say so but they reveal
that they also back Castro "because som» derive satisfaction from
seeing the zdLch on the run and the luxuidooj hotels overrun."78
Each of these elements m have studied—living conditions,
religion, associations, the comunleatlon system, and police control—omMne to form a description of what living under Castm
meant. It now becmaes possible to apply this description to our
theoretical model and to see in which areas the two patten»

%gule, p. 27.
^^•Shaughnessy, p. jSk*
7?Mmx Frankel, "Journey of Inquiry in Castro's Cuba," New
tùXk Times Magazine, (January 22, 1^61), p. 8,
%bid.
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correspond. For example, Friedrich and Brzeadnski categorise a
totalitarian regime as «xercising a monopoly over the entire
communication system of tW ®3Ciety. In Cuba, we have found that
independent facilities of the press, radio, television, and movie
films did not exist. These media were subject to government con
trol and government direction#

Coaaiinications contnal in a total!»

tarian regime extends to the area of education, according to
Fïledrich and Brzezinski»

Our study of Cuba corresponds to this

description. The Cuban educational system was directed by the
government. Included among educational goals in Cuba were plans
to indoctrinate the population in Marxiam-Leninlm, the official
ideology of the regime#

This feetor also fits the theoretical

description of Frledrlch and Brtezinski.
Hannah Arendt*s work may be oomblned with that of Friedrich
md Brzezinski in the area of descritrfjjg totalitarian terror.
These authoM present a description of spy systems, arbitrary
laws, and secret police as coi^poaents of a totalitarian system.
In Castro's Cuba, the Cammittees for the Defense of the Involution
performed the function of spy organizations. The Gg was Cuba's
secret police. The various laws, such as the Urban Reform Law,
the labor laws, the ration books contri.lmted to the police control
of Cuba's {Hjpulation,
Feierabend and Ebenstein describe the totalitarian system as
one in which autonomous organizations are non-existent. The study
of Cuba revealed the destruction of pre-revolutionary groups aM
associations and their replacement by government controlled
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organizations. We found that government interference in Cuba
extended into the field of religion. However, in the case of
Cuba, we did find a modification to complete government control.
The Gatholle Church, prevented from Interfering in either politics
or education, was permitted by the government to retain a certain
measure of autonomy in operating its charohes.
Therefore, we have been able to apply our theoretleal model
to the case study of Cuba and we have found a correspondence in
the areas of a coMounicatione monopoly, police control, and the
status of associations. However, in the case study of Cuba, we
also discovered Wo elememts which mildly affect the theoretical
model. The mlstence of an armed citizenry or national militia
coupled with the existmce of armed opposition within Cuba to the
government intrwiuoes a refinement to Friedrich and Brzezinski's
desci^ptdon of a near-complete weapons monopoly. Although the
regime did control highly tectaologically advanced weapons such
as tanks, jet fighters, and field artillery, smaller weapons were
possessed by non-govemment personnel. However, it must also be
remembered that a citizen or a guerrilla fighter armd with a rifle
cannot effectively combat a tank.
We may finally conclude that in the area of social conditions
within Cuba, we were able to find definite totalitarian charac
teristics. But these characteristics must be diluted by the fact
that withÎJî Cuba there existed a majority of citizens who actively
supported the government, not out of fear but as a reaction to
revolutionary pmgrams which benefited them.

GHAPTBR SEVEN
C0NCLD8I0W8
The case study of Castro's Cuba during the years 19$? to
1961* has included a description of the Cuban revolution, the man
who led this revolt, the political situation in Cuba, the Cuban
economic systm, and finally, eoeial conditions In Cuba. It new
becomw necessary to answer the key question with which this
thesis is concerned. Was Castro's Cuba from 19$9 to 1961$ a
totalitarian regime? Before we try to answer this question, w®
might restate the definition of a totalitarian regime as presented
by Brzezinakl.
Totalitarianism is a system in which technologically
advanced instruments of political powr are wielded idthout restraint by centralized leadersliip of an elite move
ment for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution,
including the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain
arbitrary Ideological assu^tlons proclaimed by the leader
ship, in an ataiosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire
population.^
It is possible to take each component of this definition,
coupled with the refin^ents of the original theoretical model
presented in this thesis, and to apply these descriptions to the
situation which existed in Cuba. For example, we may begin by
utilizing the first component of the definition, "technologically

iBrzezlnski, "Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics,» p. 180,
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Ill
advanced Instruments of political power."
This technologically advanced aspect of totalltarimlem
affects the areas of weapons, coBstiunication facilities, and économie
facilities. In evaluating the weapon force available to the Castro
regime, we must determine if this force can be categorized as
being technologically advanced. The Cuban regime was very well
equipped with modem weapons, including jet fighters, tanks, field
artillery, autsti-aircraft artillery, mortars, patrol vessels, and
torpedo boats. In addition, the regime directed a militia and m
army equipped with modem small aras. It was these modem weapons
which enabled the Castro regime to crush the Bay of Pigs invasion
in only seventy-two hours.^ It may be definitely concluded that
the Castro regime possessed technologically advanced, modem
instruments of power to Implement its political strength,
Brzezlnski combined his work with FVisdrich to further refine
and devflop the concept of technologically advanced weapons as
applied to the totalitarian state.

According to these authors,

the totalitarian regime possesses a near-complete monopoly of all
means of effective armW combat within the society. The case
study of Cuba revealed two conditions within Castro's Cuba tsrtiich
must be considered in evaluating the regime's control of the
forces of armed combat. Within Cuba was found evidence of effec
tive armed opposition to the government. Also within Cuba was
fo;md an armed citizenry, members of the Cuban militia. These

%i?heeler, p. 17.
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two conditions would appear to modify Brzeainski and Friedrich*s
description. Yet when one evaluates the weapons available to
the guerrilla opposition and to the militia, it is still possible
to maintain that the Castro regime possessed a near-complete
weapons monopoly. It was the regime which possessed contz^l of
highly technologically advanced weapons such as tanks and jet
fighters, instruments of power which far outshadowed small arms
such as pistols mid rifles#
Returning to Braezlnski's definition and continuity with the
concept of technologically advanced instnments of political power,
we find that technology is clearly evident in the area of communlcatlons. Therefore, we are now able to extend this parW.eular
concept to Friedrich and Brzezinski's description of the totali
tarian state as one in which the regime possesses a near-complete
monopoly of all effective media of mass coaaranications. Our case
study revealW that Cuba's modem coamunication facilities became
instruments of the government used to transmit goverament-approved
policies.
Finally, Brzezinski's utilization of technology is applicable
to the area of economic production. As Fzledrich and Brzezinskl
point out, the totalitarian regime exercises a central control and
dlrecMon of the entire economy through a bureaucratic organization.
The Case stu^y of Cuba revealed, that Cuba's Industries were
nationalized, labor oz^anlzations functioned as Instruments of
the government, and the flow of capital within the Cuban ectmmlc
systm was government-controlled through a nationalized banking
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syatem. k national planning organ was established to formulate
a C(mpl@te eeonomic blueprint. Yet, as our case study illus
trated, the central control and direction of agricultural pro
duction was s<meiAat limited. A visit to IMRA or a visit to
the farm of one of Cuba's independent farmers would modify the
concept of complete, centrally directed control. The most
KKtenslve planning organisation, ISM, appeared to be staffed
with dedicated but very uno^aniaed young men. The small farmer
of Cuba was still functioning in a limitW capacity.
From the concept of technology, Braeadnski's general defini
tion next includes the component of political powr which is
"wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite
movment," This concept was further refined by Friedrich and
Brzezinski in their combined description of totalitarian cen
tralized leadership categorized by a single party typically led
by one man. The study of Cuba revealed the existence of a cen
tralized leadership led by Fiddl Castro aœî composed of bis very
loyal, tested lieutenants. The nature of this leadership evolved
/

y

around the concept of the willadLted power of the llder aaxlBo wM
dmninated every facet of political power. This was leadership
colored by Castro*8 magnetic personality coupled with the Cuban
concept of the caudillo. The Cuban communist party's challenge
to this leadership was effectively net. Castro remained the llder,
dominating the government, the armed forces, and Cuba's newly
organised single party. His power rmuained unlimited, subject
neither to elections nor to the restraints of an indepmdmt
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judleiâiy.

According to the third component of Braezinski's definition,
this leadership is motivated by the purpoi» of effecting a total
social revolution. This description accurately fits the Castro
regime* Un<ter the leadership of Castro and his lieutenants, the
existing economic, political, social, and BdUtaiy structures of
pre-revolutionary Cuba were completely destroyed. They wre
replaced by revolutionary innovations Wiich cmpletely trans
formed Cuba. The upper classes of Cuba were robbed of their
pomitlon of leadeitJhip, A right-wing conservative leadership
elite was replaced by the left-wing radical revolutionaries. The
false democratic front which forwrly characterized Cuban ï^liti<al
rule was destroyed, to be replaced by a communist regime. Depen
dence upon the United States was supplanted

a turn to tlm

socialist camp. Finally, the capitalistic economic system was
transfon^d into a socialist system Implemented by centralized
planning»^
Brzezinski concludes his definition by stating that a
totalitarian regime is characterized by programs designed to
condition the society's citizens according to ideological fomats
proclaimed by the regime *in an atwephem of coerced unanimity,"
The case study of Cuba revealed active government programs to
condition the Cuban citizen. These programs were implmented
through the government's monopoly of control over the entire

^Matthews, R#tum to Cuba, p, 3.
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cmammleatlons ay#tern. TW press, radio, television, and movies
became instrumente of the govenment#

The Cuban people heard

and saw through theae media only what the government allowed
them to hear and see. The monopoly was extended to the field of
ediieation. This control was capped by the non-existence of
completely autonomous associations in Cuba, Government-organized
associations in revolutionazy CuW possessed the complete monopoly
of organizational membership.
Braezinski's reference to ideology is also applicable to Cuba,
whose leader professed to be a followr of the philosophy he
labeled as îiarxism-Leninism, However, this was iferxism-Leninism
Cuban style. This was a label which was applied to the method,
to the means, or enacting revolutionazy pxt>graas. This label
placed Cuba among the communist bloc of nations.

Yet the formali-

zatlmi process of the label was not completely effected in Cuba.
One simply did not find the disciplined structure in Cuba which
one finds in the older communist states. Each one of the men
who j^ayed a significant role in tW Cuban revolution, including
Fidel, Raul, and Che, had different ideas of what Marxism-Leninism
meant. The Castro regime faced drastic economic, social, and
political problems. MandLsm-I^ninism gave them a label to apply
to thd.r drastic programs of social reform.^ But the revolution
was not yet completely institutionalized. Programs were still
being formulated. The leaders needed a wide area in which to flex

kbid.. p. 10
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their mental muscles. They were not ready to be completely
dominated by a scientific, systematic set of ideological rules.
They were still experimenting, and this experimentation was led
by Fidel Castro, a man incapable of conforming to any set dogmatic
rules.^
Can the atmosphere in Cuba be descri.bed as one of ^coerced
unanimity"?

Do we find operational texror in Cuba as described

by Friedrich, Brzezinski, and AreMt in their theoretic presen
tations? The study of Cuba revealed the existence of spy systems
as implemented through the Committees for tW Defense of the
Revolution, This case study also deposed tte existence of a
secret police, the Gg. Also, according to charges presented to
the Inter-Aaericmi Commission, concentration camps existed in
Castro's Cuba. Included in reports preswated to the Comission
were chaises that the Castro regime subjected prisoners to psycho
logical torture designed to destroy the dignity of the prisoner,
i
The description of arbitrary arrests and trial proceedings of
political prisoners as preswited to the Commission is illustrative
of Ebenstein's characterization of the status of law within a
totalitarian regime—law which is always designed to strengthen
the government, not to protect the citizen. It may, therefore,
be concluded that the Castro regime did operate in an atmosphere
of coerced unanimity which allowed neither criticism nor open
opposition of government programs.

2lbid.
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As these preceding paragraphs illustrate, the Castro regime
did fit the theoretic definition of BTzezinski, The regime aleo
corresponded to the six traits preaented by both Friedrich and
Braezinskit

an official ideology, a single party led by one man,

terroristic police control, a centrally directed economy, a
monopoly of control over the society's communication media, and a

near-complete weapons monopoly»
Furthermore, correspondence to the theoretic model is further
seen when we examine the work presented by Ebenstein»

The Cuban

legal system was illustrative of Ebenstein's description. An
independent judiciary did not exist in revolutionary Cuba, The
regime openly declared that the instruments of justice were tools
of the regime. Cuba's legal codes were applied to maintain and
protect the operating regime, not to defend the citizen's right
against assault by the state. In addition, Castro's profession
of directing a truly democratic government was illustrative of
Ebenstein's description of the perversion of democratic termin
ology by totalitarian leaders. Castro maintained that his direct
contact with the Cuban people through mass meetings was the purest
form of operating democracy.

Feierabend's description of a totalitarian society as one
which cannot tolerate pluralism corresponds geaierally to the
situation in Cuba, However, the CathoUc Church's operation of
its religious functions within Castro's Cuba modifiée Feierabend's
description. As the case study illustrated, the Catholic Church
was granted a limited degree of autonomy. Finally, Feierabend's
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additional contribution conceming the isolationist and
expansdonist tendencies of totalitarian regimes is applicable
to the Cuban situation. Castro's control of coœiunications served
to isolate the Cuban citizen from outside influences. His direct
interference in the affairs of other Latin American countries
and his expx^ssed desire for revolution in Latin America modeled
after the Cuban experience were certainly illustrative examples
of expansionist tendencies.
Arendt's description of the existence of terror within the
totalitarian regime is applicable to Cut» where the existence of
spy systems, a secret police, arbitrary arrests, concentration
camps, and the utilization of psychological terror m.a charged,
let it must be remembered that a majority of Cubans supported
Castro, not because of fear hit because of his concrete programs
for social improvement.
It may be concluded, finally, that tte situation in Cuba from
1959 to I96I4 does fit the theoretic model of a totalitarian regime.
The basic characteristics were present in Cuba. However, in fair
ness to Castro and his lieutenants, the phrase "Cuba was governed
by a totalitarian regime" must be modified. The words totalitarian
regime are softened when one considéré the benefits which such a
regime brought to Cuba,

For the first time in Cuban history,

the people were governed for an extended time by a government
which was extremely honest and by men who did not attempt to
enrich their own pockets at the public expense. For the first time
in Cuban history the children of the poor were fed, clothed, and
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eâaeated*

No one in Cuba was hungiy. Educational opportunities

were available to everyone. Government programs were initiated
to impl^fônt long-range plans to strengthen the country's economy.
The young leaders made many economic mistakes.

Bat, according

to Herbert Matthews, they learned from these mistakes and their
economic hopes appeared capable of bearing fruit.
The Castro regime initiated and directed a complete revolu
tion—social, economic, and political. The revolution had at
its base programs designed to improve conditions in Cuba, every
thing from constructing a concrete home for a peasant who had
lived in a hut to increasing the gross national product. It is
obvious that Gastjro chose to implement this revolution with
totalitailan methods, but one should not lose sight of his
revolutionaiy goals when evaluating these methods.
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